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Jose Padilla is an American citizen.' The United States govern-
ment took Padilla into custody on American soil in May 2002, and it
has classified him as an enemy combatant, asserting that it can detain
him indefinitely without charging him with any crime.2 Yaser Hamdi
is also an American citizen who has been detained since Fall 2001, has
been classified as an enemy combatant, and has yet to be charged with
a crime.3 In Padilla v. Bush4, the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, like the Hamdi court, decided that because of the
present war on terrorism, the government had the authority to classify
citizens as enemy combatants. However, unlike the Hamdi court, the
Padilla court ruled that, despite the government's classification of
Padilla as an enemy combatant, he should be given access to an attor-
ney in the prosecution of his habeas corpus petition and that the court
would then review the charges and evidence and decide whether the
government properly classified Padilla as an enemy combatant.5 Both
the Padilla6 and the Hamdi7 courts applied a Supreme Court case from
J.D. Candidate 2004, Northwestern University; B.A. Northwestern University, 2001. The
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1. Padilla ex rel Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
2. Id. at 568-69.
3. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.2d 278, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2002) (hereinafter "Hamdi II').
4. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
5. Id. at 605.
6. Id. at 592, citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
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World War II, Ex Parte Quirin,s to justify detention of both citizens
as enemy combatants.
Because the law of war is so unclear, alleged enemy combatants
are at a tremendous disadvantage with respect to the government if
they do not have counsel to challenge their classification as enemy
combatants through habeas petitions. The government can only clas-
sify someone as an enemy combatant if the person is accused of violat-
ing the law of war. However, the law of war is not easy thing to de-
fine. It is codified nowhere, and even the Quirin Court admitted that
it is an amalgamation of military common law and international law.9
Not only is the law unclear, but the question of whether a charge
makes out a violation of the law of war involves an extremely fact in-
tensive inquiry. To classify someone as an enemy combatant, the
government must charge someone with violating the law of war, but it
need not prove those charges. Judicial review into enemy combatant
classification involves looking at the charges and seeing if under the
facts alleged against the accused, it amounts to a violation of the law of
war. This process is so unclear that scholars are in spirited disagree-
ment over what type of charge in the context of the war against terror-
ism would be a violation of the law of war. Scholars do not even seem
to be able to agree on whether the September 11 hijackers violated the
law of war. 0
This Note examines Padilla v. Bush as an example of the con-
temporary application of enemy combatant law. This Note argues
that in present and future applications of enemy combatant law, courts
should treat Padilla as the preferred model of application because
Padilla preserves more Constitutional protections, specifically the
right to counsel in bringing a habeas petition, than do Hamdi or
Quirin. The Padilla decision is preferable to Hamdi because Padilla
restricts the movement of enemy combatant law away from the ex-
press criminal protections of the Constitution. In contrast, Hamdi
greatly accelerates such movement.
7. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 283 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31).
8. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
9. Id. at 29-30.
10. Compare Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001) (acts of terrorism are most likely not war crimes), with Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG
2d 249 (2002) (attacks on the World Trade Center are violations of the law of war), and
Feldman, infra note 170, (acts of terrorism may or may not be violations of the law of war), and
ABA Task Force on Terrorism and the Law Report and Recommendation on Military Commis-
sions (2002) ("Although there is room for argument on both sides, it can reasonable be con-
cluded that [the September, 11 attacks] were acts of war.").
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This Note makes two sub-arguments. First, the Hamdi and
Padilla courts improperly relied on Quirin, because, like its contempo-
rary case, Korematsu v. United States,1 Quirin is a decision that drasti-
cally departs from express constitutional mandates and should no
longer be considered good law. Second, even if Quirin is still good
law, the Padilla court improperly relied upon it because the social and
political context in which Quirin was decided is markedly different
from the current social and political atmosphere.
The sub-argument that Quirin is bad law is a crucial step to the
argument of this Note that Padilla is preferable to Hamdi as an appli-
cation of enemy combatant law. It appears that Quirin is still techni-
cally good law, and the Supreme Court is unlikely to overturn it any-
time soon. If lower courts feel compelled to apply Quirin, the courts
should narrow its scope. For this reason, the Padilla decision is a bet-
ter application of the law than the Hamdi decision.
Further, this Note argues that the Hamdi court undertook a large
and unwarranted expansion of enemy combatant law as stated in
Quirin. The constitutional implications of this expansion are tremen-
dous. When a court approves the Executive's classification of an indi-
vidual as an enemy combatant, the affirmation has a huge impact on
the individual's constitutional criminal procedure rights: it nullifies all
of them. Thus, an expansion of the Executive's power in this area is
potentially quite dangerous to a citizen's rights, and the Hamdi court
was imprudent in expanding the Executive's power to unilaterally re-
voke a citizen's constitutional rights.12 The Hamdi court held that an
accused enemy combatant does not have a presumptive right to repre-
sentation by counsel when arguing through a habeas corpus petition
that the charges against him are unwarranted. Essentially, he is an en-
emy combatant by nature of the Executive's classification until he
proves himself otherwise, and without the assistance of counsel.
This Note argues that the approach of the Padilla court should
be favored over that of the Hamdi court, as Padilla is much more pro-
tective of constitutional rights of accused enemy combatants. First,
unlike Hamdi, Padilla recognized that persons classified as enemy
combatants have a presumptive right to counsel in challenging the
11. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Korematsu is the case in which the Court held that the exclusion
of all people of Japanese ancestry from the west coast of the United States during World War II
was constitutional given the circumstances. Today, it is almost universally condemned. See in-
fra 11I.A.1.
12. This Note limits itself to evaluating the implications of enemy combatant law on U.S.
citizens. Although there are certainly a multitude of legal issues pertaining to the application of
enemy combatant law to non-citizens, particularly those accused of committing violations of the
law of war in the U.S., those issues are reserved for other studies.
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classification through a habeas corpus petition. Second, like Hamdi,
the Padilla decision expanded the holding of Quirin; however, it did so
in a way that provides more protection for suspected enemy combat-
ants.1
3
The Note will briefly discuss the scope of the court's review of
an alleged enemy combatant's habeas petition and whether the review
should be limited to the legal sufficiency of the charges of violating the
law of war or be extended to also reviewing the facts supporting the
charges.
Section II provides the necessary background to explore enemy
combatant law, including the Executive's power in times of war, and
the right of an accused enemy combatant to counsel. Section II also
summarizes Padilla in detail and discusses the related Hamdi and
Quirin cases, in addition to other cases relevant to this discussion.
Section III argues that Padilla represents the preferred application of
enemy combatant law in contemporary cases. Subsection A discusses
both why Quirin is a bad decision and should no longer be considered
good law, and why even if it is technically good law, it is inapplicable
to the war against terror. Subsections B and C contain the main ar-
gument of this Note: even assuming Quirin is good law and applicable
to the war against terrorism, the Hamdi court still expanded its hold-
ing to the further detriment of a citizen's Fifth and Sixth Amendment
protections, and the Padilla court expanded Quirin's holding in the
opposite direction. The Padilla approach is preferable because it lim-
its the scope of enemy combatant law's departure from constitutional
procedural protections as allowed in Quirin. Section IV presents con-
cluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Enemy Combatant Law
The law regarding the enemy combatant issue is underdevel-
oped. Furthermore, enemy combatant law has no explicit statutory or
Constitutional foundation; it is derived exclusively from case law, and
primarily from Quirin. Enemy combatant law is relevant only in times
of war, or soon thereafter, and nearly every precedent where a court
13. The Quirin decision restricts courts' review of enemy combatants' status to a review of
the government's charges of violations of the law of war, and does not allow for any review of the
facts or evidence supporting those charges. However, under Padilla, a person classified as an
enemy combatant is allowed to present facts rebutting the government's charge that he is an en-
emy combatant. This expansion of Quirin obviously gives alleged enemy combatants greater
protection as the court will now not only review the charges that a detainee has violated the law
of war but will also conduct a review of the government's evidence supporting those charges.
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has addressed the issue prior to Hamdi II involves a situation in which
the government has tried a person in front of a military tribunal and
deprived him of his Fifth Amendment right to trial by jury and other
procedural rights. The Quirin decision presents the only time a court
has discussed in depth what an American citizen must be charged
with doing and under what circumstances to be charged as an enemy
combatant. Because Quirin is crucial precedent for this issue, this sub-
section will begin with a detailed examination of that case. The sub-
section will also discuss The Prize Cases, the other precedent the
Hamdi II court cited on the enemy combatant issue. It will also dis-
cuss Ex Parte Milligan,4 a major precedent the Padilla court cited,
and other major precedents that are not mentioned by either court, but
that are in line with the enemy combatant issue. These cases are In re
Yamashita,"5 and the recent Eastern District of Virginia case involving
the other "American Taliban," United States v. Lindh. 6 This subsec-
tion will also discuss the famous Korematsu17 case from the World
War II era.
B. Primary Cases
1. Ex Parte Quirin
In Ex Parte Quirin, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
whether or not a person is properly charged with being an enemy
combatant depends on whether or not he or she is charged with violat-
ing the "law of war," as recognized in treaties and the common law of
nations."l The Court also held that a United States citizen could be
charged as an enemy combatant, with all of the resulting Constitu-
tional rights deprivation, if he is charged with violating the law of
war.' 9 The case involved eight saboteurs captured in the United States
in 1942 with plans to destroy American war resources under instruc-
tions from the Third Reich. All of the saboteurs were of German de-
scent, but had lived in the United States; one saboteur, Richard
Haupt, was a naturalized American citizen. 2' The petitioners were
14. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
15. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
16. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
17. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
18. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29-31. Although Quirin uses the term "enemy belligerent" rather
than "enemy combatant," it seems clear that they are synonymous legal terms in this context.
19. Id. at 37. "Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve
him from the consequences of his belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law
of war." Id.
20. Id. at 20.
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charged with violating both the law of war in general and Articles 81
and 82 of the Articles of War, which defined the offenses of aiding the
enemy and espionage.2 They were tried before a military commission
pursuant to an executive order of President Roosevelt given on July 2,
1942.22
The main issue before the Court was whether the President had
the statutory or Constitutional authority to order the petitioners to be
tried by a military tribunal, rather than "in the civil courts with the
safeguards, including trial by jury, which the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments guarantee to all persons charged.
23
The government argued that no court could hear the petitioner's
habeas corpus petition because the President had denied them all ac-
cess to the courts. 24 The Quirin Court rejected this argument and re-
viewed whether the charges against the petitioners constituted viola-
tions of the law of war so as to make them enemy combatants and
whether trial by a military tribunal was constitutional. 2' However, the
Court recognized that the decisions of the President in charging peo-
ple with violations of the law of war should be given great deference.
26
The Court held that the President had constitutional and statutory au-
thority to charge enemy combatants with violations of the law of war
and to order them tried before military tribunals, depriving them of
their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
The Court reviewed provisions in the Constitution giving Con-
gress the authority to declare war,27 "To define and punish... Offenses
against the Law of Nations, '28 and giving the President the duty to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. ' 29 The Court held
that Congress's declaration of war coupled with the Articles of War,
"especially Article 15," provided ample statutory authorization for the
President to classify a person as an enemy combatant for violating the
21. Id.at23.
22. Id. at 22-23 (quoting the President's proclamation, No. 2561, 7 Federal Register 5101,
"[A]lI persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United States
or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such nation, and who during time of
war enter or attempt to enter the United States ... through coastal or boundary defenses, and are
charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or
warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdic-
tion of military tribunals.").
23. Id. at 24.
24. Id. at 24-25.
25. Id. at 25.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 26 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.).
28. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.).
29. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3.).
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law of war.3" Thus, the Court's final task was to review, with defer-
ence, the charges against the petitioners and the President's classifica-
tion of the charges as violations of the law of war.31
In holding that the offenses with which the petitioners were
charged were indeed violations of the law of war, the Court noted that
Congress chose not to enumerate the law of war statutorily, but rather
to leave it a matter of military and international common law. 2 Fi-
nally, the Court held that the charge against the petitioners of passing
secretly behind enemy lines and in civilian dress "plainly alleges viola-
tion of the law of war."
33
In summary, the petitioners were enemy belligerents and could
properly be detained and tried before a military commission. They
could also be tried for a common law criminal offense, violation of the
law of war, contrary to the established constitutional rule that charges
of criminal violations must be pursuant to particular statues and not
any concept of criminal common law. 34 The Court affirmed that the
constitutional criminal procedure rights of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments did not apply to enemy combatants.
Quirin supports the proposition that the Hamdi and Padilla
courts endorsed: the Executive can constitutionally classify someone
as an enemy combatant given some degree of congressional authoriza-
30. Id. at 27-28. Some of the Articles of War in existence then have been recodified and
still exist today. Article 15, which the Quirin Court strongly relied on as statutory authorization
for trial of offenses against the law of war before military commissions is now 10 U.S.C. § 821
providing that
[t]he provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not de-
prive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent
jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war
may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.
See Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tri-
bunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1285-86 (2002) (discussing the Articles of War existing at the time
of Quirin and today).
31. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.
32. Id. at 29-30. The Court then reviewed situations from the Revolutionary War, Mexi-
can War, and Civil War in which spies and saboteurs were tried and convicted before military
commissions as violating the law of war. Id. at 31-33, n. 9-11. The Court also quoted from the
"Rules of Land Warfare," promulgated by the War Department, and from the Hague Conven-
tion, which defined the law of war as derived from "the usages established among civilized peo-
ples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience." Id. at 35 (quoting Article
1, Annex to the Hague Convention No. IV).
33. Id. at 36.
34. Id. at 29-30, 48.
35. Id. at 38-42. An important concept to note from Quirin is that a court's review of the
government's classification of a citizen as an enemy combatant is limited only to whether the
charges against the person adequately make out a violation of the law of war, and not whether
there is sufficient evidence to support the charges. The Court stated that "We are not here con-
cerned with any question of the guilt or innocence of petitioners," and it makes it clear on nu-
merous occasions that it is only reviewing the legal sufficiency of the charges. Id. at 25.
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tion.36 The courts can review the classification, but must show defer-
ence to the Executive Branch's determination. A proper determina-
tion that a person is an enemy combatant will deprive that person of
certain procedural rights provided by the Constitution.
2. The Prize Cases
The Hamdi II and Padilla courts also rely on The Prize Cases.
However, the two courts rely on the case for different legal principles.
The Hamdi II court's reliance on the case is flawed and can be dis-
carded entirely in this background section. The Fourth Circuit in
Hamdi II cites The Prize Cases for the proposition that the court must
give deference to the Executive in military affairs and that "[t]his def-
erence extends to military designations of individuals as enemy com-
batants in times of active hostilities... [A]s far back as the Civil War,
the Supreme Court deferred to the President's determination that
those in rebellion had the status of belligerents.
' 37
However, the context of The Prize Cases is far outside that of the
Hamdi II and Quirin cases. The central inquiry of The Prize Cases
was whether certain ships the Union navy captured during the early
days of the Civil War were legally taken.38 The owners of the ships
were all neutral parties.39 The Court held that it made absolutely no
difference whether the owner of the property seized was an enemy, an
ally, or a neutral; if the ship was caught running a blockade and trans-
acting business with the enemy, the Union Navy could legally seize
it.
40
A central question the Court had to decide in The Prize Cases
was whether when the ships were seized, before Congress had declared
war, the South was an enemy with the same legal status as a foreign
nation against whom Congress had declared war.4 This is the context
in which the Hamdi II court misconstrued the case. The Prize Court
noted that despite the absence of a declaration of war, the President,
when confronted by what "the world acknowledges to be the greatest
civil war known in the history of the human race," had the authority
36. The Quirin Court specifically noted that it did not decide, and could not agree on, the
issue of whether under the circumstances of the Quirin case, Congress could restrict the power of
the President to deal with enemy combatants. See id. at 47.
37. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281-82.
38. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 665-66 (1862).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 674. "Whether property be liable to capture as 'enemies' property' does not in
any manner depend on the personal allegiance of the owner. 'It is the illegal traffic that stamps it
as 'enemies' property.' It is of no consequence whether it belongs to an ally or a citizen." Id.
41. Id. at 670.
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to treat the South as belligerents.4 2  These propositions, which the
Hamdi opinion cites, had nothing to do with the question of whether
or not to classify individuals as enemy combatants for the purpose of
deprivation of constitutional rights, but rather whether the entire Con-
federacy could be treated as an enemy nation in the same manner as if
Congress had actually declared war. The Hamdi II Court loosely ap-
plied this case, and, notably, Hamdi III does not even mention The
Prize Cases. 3
3. Ex Parte Milligan
Ex Parte Milligan is important precedent from the Civil War re-
garding the Executive's power to revoke the criminal procedure rights
of individuals accused of aiding the enemy in wartime. Because the
Milligan opinion waxed eloquently and at great length on the virtues
of the constitutional protections of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments, the Hamdi II opinion quite understandably does not
even mention Milligan, and the Hamdi III opinion does not discuss it
in any depth." Lambdin Milligan, a civilian citizen of Indiana, had
been tried, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged by a military
commission in Indianapolis in 1864. 4' After his trial and sentence, he
petitioned the U.S. Circuit Court of Indiana for a writ of habeas cor-
pus pursuant to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863.46 The Circuit Court
denied the petition and certified it for review by the Supreme Court.47
The military commission had convicted Milligan of several crimes in-
cluding "violation of the laws of war. '48 Specifically, he was charged
with attempting to organize an insurrection in the state of Indiana
42. Id. at 669-70.
43. The Hamdi II Court could potentially have cited the case as support for the argument
that the President can have general war powers even in absence of a declared war if hostilities
exist defacto, which is a legitimate reading of The Prize Cases, though possibly distinguishable in
these circumstances due to the nature of the hostilities. The Fourth Circuit may have then ar-
gued that these war powers include the ability to classify individuals as enemy combatants for
purposes of deprivation of their constitutional rights, and that although The Prize Cases does not
specifically make this argument, it is a logical extension of a President's war powers given the
Quirin case. This is in fact the very proposition for which the Padilla court relied heavily on The
Prize Cases. However, the Fourth Circuit instead chose to cite Hamdi as directly supporting the
idea that the President can classify an individual as an enemy combatant and thus deprive them
of constitutional criminal procedure rights. Thus, in reality The Prize Cases give much less sup-
port for the Fourth Circuit's enemy combatant argument than the Hamdi II opinion suggests.
44. As will be discussed, the Quirin Court also has difficulty dealing with the Milligan
precedent. The Padilla opinion, distinguished Milligan by quoting directly from Quirin and ar-
guing that the Quirin facts were more on point in Padilla's case.
45. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 107 (1866).
46. Id. at 108.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 59.
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with the goal of overthrowing the federal government in the state and
delivering it over to the Confederacy.49
The Court granted Milligan's writ of habeas corpus and held
that the 1863 Habeas Corpus Act forbids trials of civilians by military
commission in districts where federal courts were still operating."
The 1863 Habeas Corpus Act allowed the President to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus and divested courts of the power to issue the
writ for detained individuals whenever he judged that public safety
required suspension."1 Upon detaining civilians, the President was not
required to give cause for that person's detention in response to a writ
of habeas corpus. 2  However, the Act contained exceptions to the
President's general power. If the detainee was a citizen of a state in
which the federal courts were still operating, the Act required the Sec-
retaries of State and War to inform the courts of the person's deten-
tion. 3 The court would then convene a grand jury, and if the grand
jury did not indict the detainee, the court would order him dis-
charged. 4 If a grand jury was not convened within twenty days of the
detainee's arrest, the court was to discharge him. 5 The Supreme
Court held that Milligan should be discharged simply because his de-
tention and trial did not conform with the Habeas Corpus Act of
1863, which specifically called for civilian trials of all citizens of states
where the courts were operating.
5 6
However, the Milligan Court went much further than necessary
to decide the issue. It stated in dicta that, even if the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1863 did not apply, Congress and the President could never or-
der the military trial of a civilian citizen in a district where the civil
courts were still operating. 57
49. Id. at 130-131.
50. Id. at 131.
51. Id. at 115.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 115-116.
54. Id. at 116.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 131.
57. Id. at 121-22 (stating "[W]here the courts are open and their process unob-
structed.. no usage of war could sanction a military trial there for any offense whatever of a citi-
zen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service. Congress could grant no such
power; and to the honor of our national legislature be it said, it has never been provoked by the
state of the country even to attempt its exercise.); see also id. at 136-43 (Chase, C.J. concurring)
(arguing that the Court went too far in holding that Congress could never have constitutionally
authorized the trial of civilians in areas where the courts were still operating); WILLIAM
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 134-136 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1998) (arguing that the
Court was imprudent in not deciding the case on the narrower issue of whether Congress had
authorized trial by military commission in the specific circumstance at issue.).
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The Court supported these theories with some very lofty lan-
guage, noting that "[t]he importance of the main question presented
by this record cannot be overstated; for it involves the very framework
of the government and the fundamental principles of American lib-
erty," and that "[d]uring the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the
times did not allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so
necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial question." 8 The
Court held that the constitutional protections of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments were "the birthright of every American citizen...
no matter how great an offender the individual may be, or how much
his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of the country, or en-
dangered its safety."59 It further noted that, "[ft]he Constitution of the
United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace."6" Of the founding fathers, the Court observed that,
Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would
arise, when rulers and people would become restive under re-
straint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish
ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of constitu-
tional liberty would be in peril, unless established by irrepeal-
able law.6'
As will be shown below, the Supreme Court had a difficult time
reconciling the Milligan decision with its decision in Quirin.
C. Supporting Cases
1. In Re Yamashita
In Re Yamashita is an important precedent for the question of
what type of conduct constitutes violation of the law of war and per-
mits the classification of an individual as an enemy combatant. The
petitioner was General Tomoyuki Yamashita, a Japanese citizen and
the commander of the Japanese forces in the Philippines during World
War 11.62 After the liberation of the Philippines, the American army
charged Yamashita with violating the law of war.63
58. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 109.
59. Id. at 119.
60. Id. at 120.
61. Id.
62. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 5 (1945).
63. Id. The military tried him before a military commission, where he was found guilty and
sentenced to be hanged. Yamashita brought a habeas petition challenging the military commis-
sion's jurisdiction to try him. The specific charge against him was that,
While commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United States of America
and its allies, [he] unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as com-
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The military alleged that because of Yamashita's failure to con-
trol his troops, Yamashita's troops carried out various acts of cruelty
and violence on the civilian population of the Philippines, resulting in
the death of over 25,000 unarmed civilian men, women, and chil-
dren.64 There was no question that these atrocities were violations of
the law of war. But Yamashita argued that the charges against him
did not make out a violation of the law of war and that, under United
States law and the Quirin precedent, the commission did not have au-
thority to try him as an enemy combatant.6" The question for the
Court was whether under the law of war, a commander has a duty to
control his subordinates and insure that they do not violate the law of
war. 6
6
Like the Quirin Court, the Yamashita Court first asserted that it
had authority to hear the habeas petition and inquire into the jurisdic-
tion of the military commission as well as the petitioner's status as an
alleged enemy combatant.6' Relying principally on the mandates of
the Geneva and Hague Conventions concerning the treatment of civil-
ians in occupied territories, the Court held that the charges against
Yamashita, under any reasonable standard, constituted violations of
the law of war.6' The Court also upheld the military commission's ju-
risdiction. 69 Like it did in Quirin, the Court in Yamashita emphasized
that its review was limited only to the legal sufficiency of the charges
alleging violations of the law of war, and not to the guilt or innocence
of the petitioner or the evidentiary findings of the commission. °
mander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to
commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against the people of the United States
and of its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and he ... thereby
violated the laws of war.
Id.
64. Id. at 14.
65. Id. at 6-7.
66. Id.atl4-15.
67. id. at 9. "It has not withdrawn, and the Executive branch of the government could not,
unless there was suspension of the writ, withdraw from the courts the duty and power to make
such inquiry into the authority of the commission as may be made by habeas corpus." Id.
The Court fortunately has taken the first and most important step toward insuring the
supremacy of law and justice in the treatment of an enemy belligerent accused of vio-
lating the laws of war. Jurisdiction properly has been asserted to inquire 'into the
cause of restraint of liberty' of such a person. Thus the obnoxious doctrine asserted
by the Government in this case, to the effect that restraints of liberty resulting from
military trials of war criminals are political matters completely outside the arena of ju-
dicial review, has been rejected fully and unquestionably.
Id. at 30 (Murphy, J. dissenting) (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 15-18.
69. Id. at 25-26.
70. Id. at 8. The Yamashita opinion provoked the vigorous dissents of Justices Murphy and
Rutledge. Justice Murphy, who did not take part in the Quirin opinion, dissented on two
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2. Korematsu v. United States
Korematsu v. United States is a famous case on the deprivation of
constitutional rights in wartime that fits into the later discussion in
this Note. The Court considered the case of Fred Korematsu, a Japa-
nese-American convicted of violating a federal statute that prohibited
entering or remaining in a military area "contrary to the restriction
applicable to such area" as proscribed by the Secretary of War or any
military commander.71 On May 3, 1942, the United States military
grounds: he challenged both enemy combatant law in general, and he disagreed with the Court's
opinion that the charges against Yamashita amounted to violations of the laws of war. Id. at 26,
32. Regarding enemy combatant law, Murphy argued that,
The Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process of law applies to 'any person' who is
accused of a crime by the Federal Government or any of its agencies. No exception is
made as to those who are accused of war crimes or as to those who possess the status
of an enemy belligerent. Indeed, such an exception would be contrary to the whole
philosophy of human rights which make the Constitution the great living document
that it is.
Id. at 26.
Justice Murphy did not mention Quirin at all in his 15-page dissent, criticizing the enemy
combatant exception and thus did not address how it seemed to conflict with his opinion of en-
emy combatant law. He also argued that the crimes the government charged Yamashita with
were not violations of the law of war. Murphy maintained that charges that a commander who
did not expressly order atrocities upon civilian populations, but failed to prevent his troops from
committing such atrocities at a time when they were under constant attack, were not violations of
the law of war under any previously recognized international standards. Id. at 37. Murphy as-
serted that, "the United States recognizes individual criminal responsibility for violations of the
laws of war only as to those who commit the offenses or who order or direct their commission.
Such was not the allegation here." Id. at 37-38.
Justice Rutledge, who was not a member of the Court that decided Quirin, dissented on
slightly different grounds. Rutledge believed that the procedure and rules of evidence the mili-
tary commission used to try Yamashita violated due process, which Yamashita was guaranteed
even as an enemy combatant. Id. at 42. Although Rutledge, rather than arguing to overrule
Quirin, was careful to distinguish it on the grounds that it was decided when the war was still
being fought, his opinion expresses doubts about the law set down by Quirin. Id. at 46. The fact
Rutledge points to is that in Quinn, the war was still being fought, whereas Yamashita was being
tried after the cessation of hostilities.
The Court does not declare expressly that petitioner as an enemy belligerent has no
constitutional rights, a ruling that I could understand but not accept. Neither does it
affirm that he has some, if but little, constitutional protection .... I think the effect of
what it does is in substance to deny him all such safeguards.
Id. at 79. Rutledge concludes with some very strong language, arguing that the Court was open-
ing the door to a dangerous erosion of the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, and
that, "I will have no part in opening it. For once it is ajar, even for enemy belligerents, it can be
pushed back wider for others, perhaps ultimately for all." Id.
Given Justice Murphy's dissents in Yamashita and Korematsu v. United States, it is likely that
he would have been the member of the Court most sympathetic to the plight of the petitioners in
Quirin. Ironically, he disqualified himself from the case because at the time he was serving on
active duty as a lieutenant colonel in the army. See David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J.
SuP. CT. HIST. 61, 69 (1996).
71. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (quoting an Act of Congress of March 21, 1942,
56 Stat. 173, 18 U.S.C. § 97a).
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issued an order excluding all people of Japanese descent from the
West Coast of the United States; 72 subsequent orders eventually re-
quired them to report to assembly centers for relocation and deten-
tion.73 The Court limited itself to the issue of whether the order ex-
cluding people of Japanese decent from the West Coast was
unconstitutional.74 The Court famously noted that "all legal restric-
tions which curtail the rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect''S and held that the exclusion order was constitutional because
the military had sufficiently justified the necessity of the exclusion of
all Japanese from the West Coast based on evidence of disloyalty of
certain Japanese living in America. 76 Justices Roberts, Jackson, and
Murphy vigorously dissented.77
Little other precedent exists on the enemy combatant issue be-
cause of the rarity of war, and the rarity of the government's classifica-
tion of persons, particularly United States citizens, as enemy combat-
ants.78
72. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220.
73. Id. at 221.
74. Id. at 222.
75. Id. at 216.
76. Id. at 223-24. See also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Hirabayashi,
decided unanimously one year before the Korematsu case, involved an American citizen of Japa-
nese ancestry convicted of violating the same statute as Korematsu. Hirabayashi had violated a
military promulgation of General DeWitt, the commander of the Western Defense Command,
comprising the Pacific Coast states. Id. at 86. The order imposed a curfew for those of Japanese
ancestry, and was justified as necessary to prevent sabotage and espionage. Id. at 92. In affirm-
ing the conviction, the Court held that, given the circumstances, it was constitutional for the
military to impose such restrictions based on race. Id. at 101. Although the restriction dealt
with in Hirabayashi, a curfew, was less an intrusion on the Japanese than the restriction in Kore-
matsu, the total exclusion of the Japanese from their homes, the Court's opinion in Hirabayashi
had a more racist undertone than the Korematsu opinion. Consider this quote:
There is support for the view that social, economic and political conditions which
have prevailed since the close of the last century, when the Japanese began to come to
this country in substantial numbers, have intensified their solidarity and have in large
measure prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white population.
Id. at 96. Hirabayashi also provoked the three concurrences of Justices Douglas, Roberts, and
Murphy, each of whom warned that the military was not without constitutional restrictions.
Justice Murphy wrote that, "[i]n my opinion, this goes to the very brink of constitutional
power," and compared discrimination against the Japanese in America to discrimination against
the Jews in Germany. Id. at 111.. 77. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225-35. Justice Roberts wrote that, "the indisputable facts ex-
hibit a clear violation of Constitutional rights." Id. at 225. Justice Murphy wrote that "[bleing
an obvious racial discrimination, the order deprives all those within its scope of the equal protec-
tion of the laws," and that "[i]ndividuals must not be left impoverished of their constitutional
rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither substance or support." Id. at 234-35.
78. Three cases are worth at least mentioning. In Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952),
the Court denied habeas corpus to a woman who was a civilian, a U.S. citizen, and the wife of a
U.S. serviceman in occupied Germany. A military commission convicted her of killing her hus-
band. Id. at 344-45. The Court held that the Articles of War as well as international laws of war
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gave an occupying country the right to establish courts in occupied countries in which civilian
courts were not yet established. Id. at 361. However, Madsen is distinct from the present issues
because the case was not brought, nor was it decided on the theory that the petitioner's trial vio-
lated any of her constitutional criminal procedure rights such as trial by jury, and the Court did
not even mention the issue.
Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1956), involved a fact pattern that was almost
identical to Quirin. The petitioner was a U.S. citizen charged with landing on the Coast of
Maine from a German submarine in November 1944 for the purpose of "espionage, sabotage,
and other hostile acts." Id. at 431. He was tried, convicted and sentenced by a military tribunal,
and later brought a habeas petition alleging that the military commission had no jurisdiction to
try him, and that he could be tried only in civil courts "where his claimed constitutional rights to
a jury trial and assistance of counsel is vouchsafed." Id. The Ninth Circuit, in a very brief opin-
ion, directly applied Quirin, and held that it only had the power to review the charges to insure
that they properly alleged violations against the law of war, and concluded that under Quirin the
charges against him amounted to violations against the law of war. Id. at 432. Also, like peti-
tioner Haupt in Quirin, the petitioner's citizenship in the U.S. did not save him from his classifi-
cation as an enemy combatant. Id.
For a recent case commenting on enemy combatant law in dicta, see United States v. Lindh,
212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002). The military captured John Walker Lindh, the other
"American Taliban," in Afghanistan fighting with the Taliban. Id. at 545. It charged him in a
ten-count indictment which included conspiring to murder U.S. servicemen in Afghanistan fol-
lowing the attacks of September 11. Id. at 547. Lindh moved to dismiss this count on the
grounds that he was entitled to lawful combatant immunity from prosecution under the terms of
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Id. at 552-53. The
court denied him this defense based on the Geneva Convention's definition of lawful combatants
and showing deference to the President's determination that Lindh was not a lawful combatant.
Id. at 557-58. However, in dicta the court went further and linked the finding of denial of lawful
combatant immunity to being an enemy combatant under Quirin principles. Id. at 554. Thus,
according to the Lindh court's dicta, to be an enemy combatant one does not need to violate the
law of war under Quirin. Id. One needs only not to be a lawful combatant, and by process of
elimination he is an enemy combatant. Id. at 557-58.
The implications of the court's finding that John Walker Lindh is an unlawful combatant,
and thus supposedly subject to the enemy combatant principles of Quirin, raises many interest-
ing issues that are unfortunately outside the scope of this Note, but worth mentioning. The
most interesting is a waiver issue; does the government by charging an enemy combatant in fed-
eral court waive its ability to deny the enemy combatant his constitutional rights. The court la-
bels Lindh an unlawful combatant, and therefore the government could have legally tried him in
front of a military tribunal, as it tried the Quirin defendants. However, it instead chose to try
him in federal court. The question arises whether by trying him in a federal court, the govern-
ment then waives the ability to deny him criminal procedural rights that it is otherwise legally
entitled to deny him as an enemy combatant. The Lindh Court seems to imply that once Lindh
is in federal court, he has all his constitutional rights. For instance, in its discussion on the venue
issue, the Court said that "what the Sixth Amendment guarantees Lindh, and all other criminal
defendants, is a fair and impartial jury." 212 F. Supp. 2d at 551. Would this apply to all consti-
tutional rights? How about double jeopardy? If the Lindh case had not been settled by a plea
bargain, and the jury had found him "not guilty," could the government have tried him again in
front of a military tribunal under the theory that Lindh is an enemy combatant and thus not en-
titled to the prohibition against double jeopardy anyway? Although this scenario seems extreme,
consider the government's recent request in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui. After over a year of
criminal process in a federal court, the government may now seek to withdraw the case from the
courts and try Moussaoui before a military tribunal. See Jerry Markon, U.S. Appeals Ruling on
Access to al Qaeda Figure; Moussaoui Trial Could Move to Military Court over Judge's Jurisdiction,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2003, at A2. Perhaps this is just an unresolved question over the scope of
Quirin, which holds that the government does not have to give an enemy combatant full criminal
Seattle University Law Review
D. Right to Counsel of an Accused Enemy Combatant
The Supreme Court has never directly dealt with the question of
whether a person, who the government indefinitely detains without
charging with a crime, would have a right to counsel on a habeas peti-
tion to challenge the detention. Nor has the Court explained from
where the right to counsel would be derived. The court has never
reached the issue because, outside of the enemy combatant context,
the government rarely detains people indefinitely for long periods of
time without charging them with crimes. Several possible legal bases
exist for an alleged enemy combatant's right to counsel on a habeas
petition. Although the Padilla court rejected it, the most obvious ba-
sis is the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment expressly grants
an accused the right to counsel: "[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to
... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."79 The "due proc-
ess" provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments also guaran-
tee the right to counsel.8" The right to have counsel appointed has also
been granted statutorily in capital crimes since before the adoption of
the Sixth Amendment and is provided for in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.81 Indeed, the Hamdi II court conceded that if not
for the enemy combatant issue the lower court's appointment of coun-
sel would be a garden-variety order, and its discretion "almost plenary
and hardly a subject for appeal, much less reversal." 2
The Sixth Amendment would provide the most concrete and in-
violable basis for an enemy combatant's right to counsel for a habeas
petition. Because the Sixth Amendment gives the right of counsel to
an "accused," a question arises in the context of Padilla and Hamdi as
to when the right attaches. The Padilla court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel did not attach to Padilla because he had
not been charged with a crime and was therefore not an "accused";83
however, a summary of the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence renders the Padilla court's holding questionable.
procedure rights under the constitution, but does not answer the question of exactly what process
an enemy combatant must get when tried.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
80. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
81. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 44; 18 U.S.C. § 3005.
82. Handi II, 296 F.3d at 282. See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2003 WL 60109 at *17 (here-
inafter "Hamdi III") ("As an American citizen, Hamdi would be entitled to the due process pro-
tections normally found in the criminal justice system, including the right to meet with counsel,
if he had been charged with a crime. But, as we have previously pointed out, Hamdi has not
been charged with a crime. He is being held as an enemy combatant pursuant to the well-
established laws and customs of war.").
83. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
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In Powell v. Alabama, the Court articulated the reasoning behind
the right for counsel and how it relates to when and in what proceed-
ings that right attaches:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of the law. If charged with crime, he
is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge .... He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one.
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him.
84
The Court later clarified the clause "every step in the proceed-
ings against him" to mean that an accused enjoys the right of counsel
at any "critical stage" in the proceedings against him.88 An accused
need not be formally accused or indicted for the right to counsel to at-
tach.86 However, in pre-charge proceedings, a court must undertake a
very fact intensive inquiry to determine whether the right to counsel
has attached.87
For Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla to have a right to counsel in
their habeas proceedings, they must both be an "accused" under Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, and the habeas proceedings must be a
"critical stage" in their prosecutions. Neither case involves formal ac-
cusations, and it is unclear when or if the government will ever for-
mally charge the two petitioners. However, Hamdi had been detained
and interrogated for approximately nine months at the time of the
Fourth Circuit's opinion, and Padilla for approximately seven months.
The fact that the government has detained the petitioners for so long
is sufficient evidence that they are accused of something, though not
yet formally. Furthermore, by claiming that Padilla and Hamdi are
enemy combatants and arguing for the application of Quirin, the gov-
ernment is also implicitly charging them with violating the law of war,
and the Padilla court will soon evaluate evidence to determine if the
"charges" that Padilla is an enemy combatant are sufficient. There-
84. 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
85. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963).
86. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) (finding petitioner was de-
prived right to assistance of counsel even though not formally accused when the police arrested
petitioner and denied him access to counsel during his interrogation).
87. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-91 (1972).
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fore, this Note takes the position that Padilla and Hamdi are accused
under the Sixth Amendment. 8
The next issue is whether a habeas petition to free a person de-
tained for a prolonged period is a "critical stage." Even conservative
legal scholars have recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches in habeas proceedings resulting from prolonged de-
tention. 9 Habeas proceedings are even more critical for enemy com-
batants, because their constitutional rights are determined though ha-
beas review, when the court determines if they have been properly
classified as enemy combatants.
This Note assumes that a person detained indefinitely if not an
enemy combatant would have either a constitutional or statutory right
to counsel, or both. The Fourth Circuit conceded that Hamdi would
have a right to both appointed and retained counsel were he not
charged with being an enemy combatant.9" Additionally, the Padilla
court recognized such a right for Padilla notwithstanding his classifi-
cation as an enemy combatant.9 This Note will assume that Hamdi
and Padilla would have a right to counsel in their habeas proceedings
if it were not for the enemy combatant issue.92
88. See generally Escobedo, 378 U.S. 478 (holding that arrest and interrogation without for-
mal accusation can in some circumstances render the detainee and "accused" for Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel purposes). Padilla distinguishes Escobedo by pointing out that the interro-
gations in that case were meant to develop into and be used as the basis for a criminal trial.
89. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 139
(Yale University Press 1977).
One risk is the threat of prolonged pretrial detention-a threat triggered by arrest or
indictment. To prevent this evil, an accused may need to file a habeas writ.. and
these are things that lawyers are (or at least should be) good for. Filing writs and the
like requires familiarity both with broad and substantive law-the rights of free men
and women-and technical procedural law: where to file, with what words, before
whom, and so on.
Id.
90. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 282-83.
91. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
92. United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass. 2002), provides a very interesting
contrast to the tone of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Hamdi II regarding an individual's right to
counsel. Richard Reid, the alleged "shoe- bomber," is not an American citizen. Reid has been
accused of trying to blow up a transatlantic flight by igniting bombs concealed in his shoes. Id.
at 87. Unlike Hamdi, the government charged Reid in federal court with a variety of federal
crimes, although his conduct may arguably be classified as a violation of the law of war (his con-
duct, acts of sabotage on behalf of a foreign enemy, seems very similar to that of the petitioners
in Quirin). Pursuant to federal law, the Attorney General promulgated "Special Administrative
Measures" ("SAMs") upon Reid. Id. at 86. SAMs can be imposed on a federal prisoner if the
government finds that "there is a substantial risk that a prisoner's communications or contacts
with persons could result in death or serious bodily injuries to persons .... Id. at 86, quoting 28
C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (1996). As in Hamdi II, the government claimed that security concerns neces-
sitated a restriction on an individual's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 87. The Mar-
shall Service imposed a list of SAM's concerning communications between Reid and his attor-
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One notable effect of the Padilla court's finding that there was a
statutory, as opposed to constitutional, right to counsel, is that it al-
lows courts greater flexibility in denying enemy combatants the right
to counsel, rather than establishing an immutable right. The Sixth
Amendment grants all accused the right to counsel, whereas the ha-
beas corpus statutes require the court to appoint counsel only where
"the interests of justice so require."93
E. Recent Developments in Enemy Combatant Case Law
1. Padilla v. Bush
Jose Padilla is an American citizen by birth and was captured in
Chicago in May 2002 pursuant to a material witness warrant. 4 On
June 9, 2002 President Bush issued an order classifying Padilla as an
enemy combatant." The government alleges that Padilla is an enemy
combatant because he conspired in Afghanistan with senior members
of the Al Qaeda terrorist network to build and detonate a radioactive
"dirty bomb" in the United States. Padilla, through his counsel,
filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the lawfulness of his deten-
neys from the Federal Defender's office. Id. at 87-88. The SAMs required Reid's attorneys to
execute a document confirming the receipt of the SAMs and to return it to the U.S. Attorney's
Office. Id. at 88. When Reid's attorneys refused to sign the document, the government entirely
cut off the defense counsels' access to their client. Id. The defense sought an emergency order
allowing them to meet with their client and nullifying the SAMs, which the Court granted. Id. at
88-89. The Court later reversed its order and upheld the presumptive validity of the SAMs, ex-
cept for the requirement that the defense attorneys expressly sign off on the SAMs. Id. at 91.
The government then modified the SAMs and dropped the requirement that the defense sign an
affirmation of their receipt of the SAMs. Despite the fact that the government's modification of
the SAM's mooted the issue of their constitutionality under the Sixth Amendment, Chief Judge
Young chose to opine on the issue anyway, and he used it as an opportunity to expound with
great pomp on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 92-94. The Judge wrote that "[t]he
affirmation [requirement acknowledging receipt of the SAM's] unilaterally imposed by the Mar-
shals Service as a condition of the free exercise of Reid's Sixth Amendment right to consult with
his attorneys fundamentally and impermissibly intrudes on the proper role of defense counsel."
Id. at 94. Judge Young then went on to cite situations from American history that illustrated the
importance of an accused's right to counsel, including John Adams' agreeing to represent the
British soldiers who allegedly committed the Boston Massacre because "no man in a free country
should be denied the right to counsel and a fair trial." Id. at 95 (quoting John Adams). The
Judge even quoted Shakespeare and explained the vital role of lawyers in a free society. Id. at 95-
96. The Reid case stands in stark contrast to the Hamdi II case because of the Court's treatment
of Reid's right to an attorney, and because it shows that enemy combatants who are nonetheless
formally charged in federal court will likely enjoy all the protections granted by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.
93. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(2)(B) (2000)).
94. Id. at 568.
95. Id. at 571.
96. Id. at 572-73.
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tion and seeking an order that he be permitted to consult with coun-
sel.97 The parties did not dispute that Padilla is being held incommu-
nicado and that he has not been allowed to consult with his lawyer.98
The district court decided that given the war on terrorism, the
government had the ability to invoke enemy combatant law and to
classify citizens as enemy combatants even in the absence of a declared
war.99 The court found that this authority was derived from the Presi-
dent's constitutional power to repel armed attacks against the United
States,' and also from the Joint Resolution of Congress of September
18.101
The court also recognized Padilla's right to counsel in his habeas
petition, which challenged the government's classification of him as an
enemy combatant. 10 2 However, the court found that this right was not
rooted either in the Sixth Amendment, which it reasoned did not ap-
ply to Padilla, or in "due process. "103 Rather, it held that Padilla's
right to counsel was derived by the habeas corpus statutes, which
permit a court's appointment of counsel if "the interests of justice so
require."'0 4  Peculiarly, in determining if the interests of justice re-
quired appointment of counsel in Padilla's case, the court used Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence as a guide.0 5
The court held that Padilla should have access to counsel for the
limited purpose of challenging his classification as an enemy combat-
ant through his habeas petition.0 6 The court rejected the govern-
ment's arguments that allowing Padilla access to an attorney might
negatively impact national security and public safety as "gossamer
speculation."'0 7 Hamdi II was distinguishable because the lower court
in Hamdi II did not evaluate whether allowing Hamdi access to an at-
torney would have national security implications and, because Padilla
97. Id. at 569.
98. Id. at 574.
99. Id. at 588.
100. Id. at 590.
101. Id. at 598-99.
102. Id. at 599.
103. Id. at 599-602. The court did not expressly reject the due process basis for a right to
counsel, holding that there was a nonconstitutional basis for allowing Padilla counsel, and it
would be more prudent to decide the issue on those grounds.
104. Id. at 600 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(2)(B) (2000)).
105. Id. at 603 (stating "Although, as noted above, the right-to-counsel jurisprudence de-
veloped in cases applying the Sixth Amendment does not control in this case, there would seem
to be no reason why that jurisprudence cannot at least inform the exercise of discretion here. In
Sixth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has stressed repeatedly the importance of counsel to
a defendant").
106. Id.
107. Id. at 604.
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had been allowed to consult with counsel before the government clas-
sified him as an enemy combatant, any prophylactic effects of refusing
him access to counsel may have already been lost."'8
The Padilla court also did something that it admitted was novel:
it held that Padilla would be allowed, through counsel, to present his
own facts and evidence to counter the government's contention that he
was an enemy combatant. 10 9 It also crafted a standard to use in re-
viewing the evidence. The court determined that after hearing all the
facts, it would apply a standard that was very deferential to the gov-
ernment and ask whether the government had presented "some evi-
dence" that Padilla committed acts that made him an enemy combat-
ant. ' The court would also determine whether the evidence was
mooted by events subsequent to detention."1
At the time of the writing of this Note, the government had
asked Chief Judge Mukasey of the Southern District of New York to
reconsider his previous ruling allowing Padilla access to a lawyer. In
its brief, the government cited numerous national security concerns
that would result from allowing Padilla to meet with a lawyer."12
2. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
a. Hamdi II
Yaser Hamdi, the "Cajun Taliban," was born in Louisiana and is
a United States citizen."1 The United States military captured Hamdi
in the fall of 2001 while he was fighting in Afghanistan for the Tali-
108. Id. at 604-05.
109. Id. at 607 (arguing that precedence offers no guidance in determining whether the
court can look at facts presented by the alleged enemy combatant and what standard to apply in
determining if the enemy combatant classification is proper).
110. Id.at608.
111. Id. at 610. The court did not give any examples of what events might moot such evi-
dence.
112. Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Asks Judge to Deny Terror Suspect Access to Lawyer, Saying it
Could Harm Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003. In an order issued March 11, Judge Mu-
kasey rejected the government's motion to reconsider his prior ruling. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, No.
02 Civ. 4445, slip op. at 35 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2003). After taking the government to task for
undue delay in pursuing the motion and questioning its motive for the delay, id. at 20, the court
rejected all of the government's additional arguments as to the dangerousness of allowing Padilla
access to an attorney as speculation, id. at 25, and reaffirmed Padilla's right to a lawyer under the
habeas statute. Id. at 25-26. After distinguishing Hamdi III from the Padilla case on the basis
of the fact that Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan and Padilla in the United States, id. at 32-33,
the court concluded by noting: "Lest any confusion remain, this is not a suggestion or a request
that Padilla be permitted to consult with counsel, and it is certainly not an invitation to conduct a
further 'dialogue' about whether he will be permitted to do so. It is a ruling-a determination-
that he will be permitted to do so." Id. at 35.
113. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 280.
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ban.114 Initially the U.S. government detained him at Camp X Ray at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."' Once it discovered Hamdi to be an
American citizen, the government transferred him to the Naval Brig at
Norfolk, Virginia, where it has detained him since April 2002 without
charging him with a crime.'16
On May 10, 2002, the Federal Public Defender for the Eastern
District of Virginia filed a habeas corpus petition on Hamdi's be-
half.1 17 The district court ordered that "Hamdi must be allowed to
meet with his attorney because of fundamental justice provided under
the Constitution.""'  After resolving the procedural question of who
had standing to bring a habeas petition on Hamdi's behalf, the district
court ordered the government to answer the habeas petition.1 9 It also
appointed the Federal Public Defender as counsel for Hamdi and
again directed the government to allow Hamdi unmonitored access to
counsel.121
Before the Fourth Circuit, the government argued that Hamdi is
an enemy combatant, and as such, "may be detained at least for the
duration of the hostilities," and that "[e]nemy combatants who are
captured and detained on the battlefield in foreign land' have 'no gen-
eral right under the laws and customs of war, or the Constitution...
to meet with counsel concerning their detention, much less to meet
with counsel in private. '' 12' The government also argued that the mili-
tary's determination that a person, even an American citizen, is an en-
emy combatant raises a political question, which the courts cannot re-
view. 12  Rather than dismissing Hamdi's habeas petition outright, in a
June 26, 2002 opinion ("Hamdi II"), the Fourth Circuit reversed the





118. Id. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed this order on procedural grounds, holding
that the Public Defender did not have next friend status to Hamdi to be able to file the petition
on his behalf. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir. 2002) (hereinafter "Hamdi
I"). Thus, Hamdi I did not even reach the substantive issues in the petition because the petition
was improperly filed. Hamdi's father then filed his own habeas corpus petition on behalf of his
son as next friend. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 280. This petition asked the court to appoint counsel
for the detained because he is indigent, asked the court to order the government to cease all inter-
rogations of Hamdi while the habeas litigation was pending, and asked the court to order the re-
lease of the petitioner from the government's custody. Id.
119. Id. at 280-81.
120. Id. at 281.
121. Id. at 282 (quoting government assertion).
122. Id. at 283.
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determine whether Hamdi can properly be classified as an enemy
combatant. 123
The Fourth Circuit gave few directions to the district court in
determining Hamdi's enemy combatant status other than advising the
district court to give deference to the government. Citing Justice Jack-
son's concurrence in Youngstown,124 and a September 18, 2001, resolu-
tion of Congress, the court reasoned that the courts give the Executive
greatest deference when it acts in the realm of international relations
and military affairs, and also where it acts with statutory authorization
from Congress. 12' The court cited, but gave little discussion of the
two cases, the Quirin case and The Prize Cases, in which it claims the
Court had granted the executive great deference specifically in the de-
termination of whether someone is an enemy combatant.
126
It is important to note that, according to Hamdi II, Hamdi did
not have a right to representation by counsel while the lower court de-
termined his enemy combatant status. By mandating that the lower
court determine whether Hamdi is an enemy combatant and by refus-
ing to appoint or allow access to counsel in this determination the
Fourth Circuit implicitly denied that Hamdi had any right to counsel
in challenging his classification as an enemy combatant through a ha-
beas petition.
b. Hamdi III
In an order on January 8, 2003 ("Hamdi III"), the Fourth Circuit
dismissed Yasser Hamdi's entire habeas corpus petition.127 After the
123. Id. at 284. According to the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi 11, the central inquiry in decid-
ing Hamdi's right to counsel, and his right to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, is whether
or not the government can properly classify him as an enemy combatant. The opinion states that
according to precedence, if the government has properly classified Hamdi as an enemy combat-
ant, they can detain him indefinitely, deny him access to an attorney, try him in front of a mili-
tary tribunal, and revoke other civil liberties and due process rights that the Constitution grants
an accused criminal.
The opinion also chided the district court for failing to determine the national security impli-
cations of its June 11 order and for not conducting any analysis suitable for appellate review as to
whether or not Hamdi is properly charged with being an enemy combatant: "The June 11 order
does not consider what effect petitioner's unrmonitored access to counsel might have upon the
government's ongoing gathering of intelligence. The order does not ask to what extent the fed-
eral courts are permitted to review military judgments of combatant status." Id.
124. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
125. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281 (citing Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-61
(1981); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); United States
v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 63 (1897)).
126. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 282 (citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862)).
127. Hamdi III, 2003 WL 60109 at *19.
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Fourth Circuit issued its opinion in Hamdi II, the district court under-
took its instruction to determine whether or not Hamdi was properly
charged with being an enemy combatant. The lower court determined
that the government's allegations against Hamdi leading to his classi-
fication fell "far short" of permitting his detention.128 Accordingly,
the court ordered the government to produce further evidence pertain-
ing to his capture including, "among other things, copies of Hamdi's
statements and the notes taken from any interviews with him; the
names and addresses of all interrogators who have questioned Hamdi;
statements by members of the Northern Alliance regarding the cir-
cumstances of Hamdi's surrender."' 29 The District Court intended to
conduct a factual inquiry into whether the charges and the evidence
supported Hamdi's classification as an enemy combatant. The Gov-
ernment petitioned for interlocutory review of the order, and the dis-
trict court certified the question of whether the undisputed facts taken




In denying Hamdi's petition, the Fourth Circuit clarified and
expanded Hamdi II. Hamdi III is significant for discussing what a
court reviews in determining if enemy combatant classifications are
proper. Hamdi III relies heavily on Hamdi II, citing or quoting the
earlier opinion nearly ten times, and reaches the same conclusions
concerning the applicability of enemy combatant law to the war on
terrorism. Hamdi III does not decide the right to counsel issue, be-
cause it was not raised. 3' The Federal Public Defender argued the
case on Hamdi's behalf but was not permitted to consult with him.
32
The Fourth Circuit held that the disclosure the district court sought
from the government was improper because the undisputed facts per-
mitted his detention as an enemy combatant, and given the great def-
erence due to the Executive by nature of his war powers, a further fac-
tual inquiry into Hamdi's activities in Afghanistan would be
inappropriate and would violate principles of separation of powers.
1 33
128. Id. at 4.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at7, n.4.
132. Id. at 1.
133. Id. at 15.
The factual averments in the affidavit, if accurate, are sufficient to confirm that
Hamdi's detention conforms with a legitimate exercise of the war powers given the
Executive by Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution and, as discussed elsewhere, that
it is consistent with the Constitution and laws of Congress. Asking the Executive to
provide more detailed factual assertions would be to wade further into the conduct of
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In fact, the Fourth Circuit even declined to adopt the "some evidence"
factual standard that the government proposed.134 The undisputed
facts that the military captured Hamdi in Afghanistan with a weapon
and associated with the Taliban were enough for the Fourth Circuit to
determine that he is an enemy combatant subject to all the resulting
deprivation of constitutional rights.
135
III. DISCUSSION
Subsection (A) criticizes enemy combatant law as it was applied
by the Hamdi and Padilla courts on two separate grounds. First, the
Quirin precedent and the entire basis of enemy combatant law is fun-
damentally inconsistent with the Constitution. Second, the Hamdi
and Padilla courts erred in applying the Quirin precedent and thus ex-
panded its use from situations in which Congress has declared war to
times when the military is simply engaged in hostilities without spe-
cific authorization from Congress.
Subsections (B) and (C) contain the main argument of this note:
Quirin and enemy combatant law are constitutionally suspect; there-
fore, courts should not further apply the precedent. Subsection (B) ar-
gues that if Quirin is still good law and continues to be applied, that
the Hamdi II court expanded its holding in a constitutionally imper-
missible manner by denying Hamdi the right to counsel to determine
whether he was properly classified as an enemy combatant. The
Hamdi standard further erodes the constitutional protections afforded
to citizens accused of violating the law of war because of the virtual
impossibility for a detainee to successfully challenge his detention as
an enemy combatant. Subsection (C) argues that if courts continued
to apply Quirin and enemy combatant law, the Padilla court's ap-
proach in granting Padilla the right to counsel is preferable to the
Hamdi III approach because it makes enemy combatant law more con-
sistent with the constitutional protections guaranteed in all other
criminal cases.
war than we consider appropriate and is unnecessary to a meaningful judicial review
of this question.
Id. (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 16.
135. Id. at 18-19.
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A. Criticisms of Enemy Combatant Law as Stated and Applied by the
Hamdi and Padilla Courts
1. Quirin: A Bad Precedent?
The Quirin Court's conclusion that citizens charged with viola-
tions of the law of war can be classified as enemy combatants and de-
prived of their criminal procedure rights has almost no support in Su-
preme Court precedent and no textual support in the Constitution.
Indeed, the case is in conflict with precedent and express dictates of
the Constitution. There are several lines of reasoning why Quirin is
simply a bad precedent and not controlling law on the enemy combat-
ant issue. The crux of these lines of reasoning is simply that enemy
combatant law is obsolete, at least as applied to U.S. citizens. The
Court decided Quirin at the height of World War II, when war nerves
were the most acute. Moreover, the decision deviated fundamentally
from the U.S. Constitution as well as from the major precedent on the
issue of deprivation of criminal procedure rights in wartime, Milligan.
Thus, Quirin is in the same boat as the Korematsu case, technically still
good law but universally recognized as obsolete. Under this argu-
ment, both the Hamdi and Padilla courts were wrong in deciding to
continue applying Quirin and recognizing the continuing vitality of
enemy combatant law.
a. Constitutional Arguments
Without much discussion of the actual Constitution, the Quirin
case carved out an exception to express constitutional dictates regard-
ing criminal procedure rights. The exception applies to enemy com-
batants who are charged with violating the law of war, regardless of
whether or not they are U.S. citizens.136 In Article III, the Constitu-
tion provides that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im-
peachment, shall be by Jury." '137 In the section immediately following,
the Constitution states that "Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their Ene-
mies, giving them Aid and Comfort."' 3 a Treason must also be proved
on the "[t]estimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act.' ' 139 The
Constitution also contains the criminal procedure rights of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth amendments, as well as due process guaranteed under
136. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 44.
137. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c. 3.
138. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, c. 1.
139. Id.
[Vol. 26:651
2003] Detaining United States Citizens as Enemy Combatants 677
the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 ' People accused of treason clearly have
all the criminal procedural protections of the Constitution.
The Quirin Court was faced with two large constitutional ques-
tions: (1) why criminal procedural rights such as trial by jury and right
to counsel did not apply to enemy combatants who were United States
citizens; and (2) why a citizen's alleged violation of the law of war to
the detriment of the United States and in aid of its enemies failed to
constitute treason. The Quirin Court offers various constitutional ar-
guments for why enemy combatants are not guaranteed normal crimi-
nal procedure rights, but these arguments are shaky at best. The Con-
stitution explicitly lists several procedural protections, but no
exceptions for enemy combatants. Yet, the Court argued that Article
III, section 2, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not protect en-
emy combatants because crimes in violation of the law of war were
never intended to be constitutionally protected.' The Court rea-
soned that "all Crimes" under Article III did not necessarily mean all
crimes because jury trials are not required for petty offenses and cer-
tain criminal contempt charges. 142  To support the proposition that
crimes against the law of war do not require a trial by jury, the Court
quoted an 1806 statute derived from a Resolution of the Continental
Congress that allowed alien spies to be tried by court martials.'43 The
Court also opined that "It has not hitherto been challenged, and, so far
as we are advised, it has never been suggested in the very extensive lit-
erature of the subject that an alien spy, in time of war, could not be
tried by a military tribunal without a jury.' 1 44 Although the Court's
conclusion that alien enemy combatants charged with violations
against the law of war do not constitutionally have to be tried before
juries is somewhat dubious, it is supported in historical precedent,
though not expressly in the Constitution or in Supreme Court prece-
dent. However, the rationale regarding alien enemy combatants is
tangential to the cases against Hamdi and Padilla, just as it was tan-
gential to the case against Richard Haupt, the American citizen peti-
tioner in Quirin.
The Supreme Court carved out a new constitutional rule in de-
ciding that an American citizen could be classified an enemy combat-
ant, and its rule directly contradicts the Milligan precedent. The
Court cites only one Supreme Court authority, Gates v. Goodloe, in
140. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, VI, XIV.
141. Quirin,317U.S.at40.
142. Id. at 41.
143. Id. (quoting Act of Congress of April 10, 1806, 2 Stat. 371).
144. Id. at 42. The Court proceeded to cite several examples of trials before military com-
missions of enemy spies during wartime, before the Milligan decision. See id., n. 14.
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support of the proposition that "[c]itizens who associate themselves
with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid,
guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are en-
emy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the
law of war.""14 However, Gates v. Goodloe'46 has virtually nothing to
do with the enemy combatant issue in the context of Quirin. Gates
was a post-Civil War bankruptcy case. The Court had no sympathy
for the claimant and held that by joining the rebellion and escaping
behind enemy lines he had forfeited the right to rents on his property
for the times he was in the Confederacy.147
Only a very broad reading of Gates could provide support for en-
emy combatant law and denial of express constitutional rights created
by Quirin, yet it was the best that the Court could do. Presumably,
the Court inferred that if the military could temporarily deprive a con-
federate sympathizer of his property during the Civil War without
much procedure, then the military could likewise deprive a citizen
charged with violating the law of war during World War II of his life
without express constitutional guarantees such as trial by jury. This
inference is tenuous at best. Gates did not involve a charge of violat-
ing the law of war or any other criminal charges.
The Quirin Court struggled to explain why the Milligan decision
was not controlling in the case. Milligan held that where courts are
open and operating normally, the laws and usages of war could never
justify the trial of a civilian citizen before a military commission for
"any offense." '148 The Quirin Court called Milligan "inapplicable to
the case presented by the present record," because Milligan had never
been associated with the enemy's armed forces.' 49 The Quirin Court
argued that in Milligan, "the Court was at pains to point out that
Milligan, a citizen and twenty years resident in Indiana, who had
never been a resident of any of the states in rebellion, was not an en-
emy belligerent . . . . "' However, this reading of Milligan ignores
both the plain language and facts of that case. The record and argu-
ments before the Milligan Court indicate that the military commission
convicted Milligan of "'[v]iolation of the laws of war;' which, accord-
ing to the specifications, consisted of an attempt, through a secret or-
ganization, to give aid and comfort to rebels.'... Thus, the Quirin
145. Id. at 37-38.
146. 101 U.S. 612 (1879).
147. Id. at 617-18.
148. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2,121-22 (1866).
149. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
150. Id.
151. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 59.
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Court either completely ignored the fact that Milligan was convicted
of violating the law of war, or it believed that the charges against
Milligan did not constitute violations of the law of war, or it distin-
guished the case on other grounds.
The only other basis for distinction was that the Quirin petition-
ers had expressly cooperated with the enemy, while Milligan, although
plotting insurrection on behalf of the Confederacy, was not expressly
"associated with the armed forces of the enemy" and therefore "was a
non-belligerent. '"152 However, this reading only further confounds the
Quirin Court's enemy combatant law. Under this interpretation, to be
an enemy combatant, not only must a citizen violate the law of war,
like Milligan, he must do so while expressly cooperating with the en-
emy's armed forces. The fact that Milligan secretly plotted his insur-
rection on behalf of the enemy and may have violated the law of war
was not enough because he was not charged with expressly associating
with the enemy's military. According to the Quirin Court, this dis-
tinction was enough to get over the dictate of Milligan that "where the
courts are open and their process unobstructed . . . no usage of war
could sanction a military trial there for any offense whatever of a citi-
zen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service.
' 153
b. Problems in Contemporary Applications of Enemy Combatant Law
The Quirin Court's treatment of Milligan creates a large problem
for current courts attempting to apply precedent in enemy combatant
cases. Because the Court distinguished rather than expressly over-
ruled Milligan, Milligan remains good law. However, it is difficult to
conceive a scenario where Milligan would apply but Quirin would not.
As suggested above, one potential example would be where a citizen
plotted insurrection or terrorists acts against the United States in the
midst of a war, but did so independently and without associating with
the enemy. However, the Padilla court's treatment of Milligan shows
that, in all likelihood, Quirin completely overruled it sub silentio.1"4
Perhaps the greatest inconsistency between Quirin and the Con-
stitution is the Court's failure to reconcile enemy combatant law with
the express protection the Constitution gives citizens accused of trea-
son. Quirin created a new class of offenses, violations of the law of
war, thereby giving these violators less constitutional protection than
152. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
153. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22.
154. Padilla ex rel Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (arguing
that "Milligan, however, received a narrow reading in Quirin" and determining that Quirin
should apply).
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any other offenders. The problem is that Quirin effectively makes
treason an element of a violation of the law of war, meaning that, con-
stitutionally, those accused of violating the law of war should get
greater, rather than reduced, procedural protections.
The principle that individuals accused of treason have all the
criminal procedure rights as other criminals is clear from the structure
of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to trial by jury in all
criminal trials, defines thereafter the crime of treason, and places an
additional burden for proving treason. Indeed, treason is the only
crime the Constitution specifically defines, and it does so in the con-
text of giving individuals accused of treason more protection. The
original intent of the Framers further supports the argument that indi-
viduals accused of treason have the same procedural rights as other
criminal defendants.155 For instance, the right to have counsel ap-
pointed in cases of treason was guaranteed statutorily one year before
the adoption of the Sixth Amendment;156 this is a good indicator that
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were meant to apply to those ac-
cused of treason, and nobody has suggested the contrary.
The Court failed to explain why committing or intending to
commit hostile acts against the United States is sometimes considered
a violation of the law of war, and at other times treason. Sabotage and
espionage are crimes that are statutorily defined both currently and at
the time of Quirin. s7 When the government creates another offense,
such as a "violation of the law of war" and defines it as committing a
criminal act such as sabotage on behalf of and under the instruction of
a foreign enemy during wartime, it sounds like "adhering to their
Enemies" or "giving them Aid and Comfort," which is the definition
of treason under the Constitution." 8 The Court said that the specific
violation Haupt, the U.S. citizen, was charged with was passing
through the military lines of the United States in civilian dress with
155. See generally James G. Wilson, Chaining the Leviathan: the Unconstitutionality of Exe-
cuting Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 99 (1983) (discussing the history behind
the treason clause of the Constitution and the original intent of the Framers).
156. See Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 118.
157. See 18 U.S.C. § 793 et seq. (criminalizing espionage); 18 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq. (crimi-
nalizing sabotage).
158. Certainly a particular activity can lead to a charge of either treason or another crime.
If a citizen fighting with an enemy of the United States kills a U.S. soldier, he may be charged
with murder, or he may be charged with treason and given the further constitutional protections
that treason entails. However, this Note argues that he cannot be charged with a hybrid crime,
such as a violation of the law of war, which combines as elements a criminal act such as murder
(or espionage or sabotage) and the requirement that the criminal act be committed while aiding a
wartime enemy of the U.S. The government can only charge someone with such a hybrid crime
if it gives the defendant the procedural protections given other treason defendants because trea-
son is essentially an element of the hybrid crime.
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hostile purpose, and that offense was completed at the moment he en-
tered the United States without uniform.'59 "For that reason, even
when committed by a citizen, the offense is distinct from the crime of
treason defined in Article III, section 3, of the Constitution, because
the absence of uniform essential to one is irrelevant to the other.
161
This is the only explanation the Court gave as to why Haupt's crimes
were violations of the law of war and not treason. Following this
quote, the Court cited two cases, Morgan v. Devine.6 and Albrecht v.
United States. 162 These two cases are completely irrelevant to the issue
of why crossing military lines in civilian dress to commit hostile acts in
aid of one's country's enemy is a violation of the law of war rather
than treason.'63
The Court's uniform versus non-uniform distinction for why the
charges did not constitute treason is confusing, and the Court does not
substantiate it with any authority. Treason is the crime to which "the
absence of uniform is essential," but not to a violation of the law of
war. The Court failed to support this distinction with authority.
Considering the two cases the Court cited, the only logical argument
that the Court could have implied by citing these cases was that Haupt
was charged with an offense that could constitute both violating the
law of war and committing treason. 164 Still, this argument fails if it is
based on the cases cited. In Morgan and Albrecht, the Court decided
that sabotage and treason were distinct charges.'65 Certainly a person
who commits sabotage on behalf of a foreign enemy can be tried for
sabotage independently of treason. However, if an element of a crime
is that the person commit the crime while giving aid to the enemy,
then the individual can only be tried for treason, along with the addi-
tional protection the Constitution provides for treason.
159. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38 (1942).
160. Id.
161. 237 U.S. 632 (1914).
162. 273 U.S. 1 (1926).
163. Morgan involved two defendants who were each charged and convicted of both break-
ing into a post office with the intent to steal stamps and actually stealing postal property. Mor-
gan, 237 U.S. at 636-37. The Court held that it was not double jeopardy to try and sentence the
defendants under two different offenses that arose out of what the defendants argued was a single
transaction. Id. at 640-41. Albrecht involved many different procedural questions, but the
Quirin Court cited it for the same proposition for which it cited Morgan, that handing down
separate sentences for different counts arising out of a single transaction does not constitute dou-
ble jeopardy. Albrecht, 273 U.S. at 11.
164. Letters Chief Justice Stone wrote to his law clerk Bennett Boskey seem to suggest that
this was the argument that he was trying to make. See Danelski, supra note 70, at 72-73. These
letters also indicate that Justice Stone and his law clerks struggled greatly in finding authority to
support several of the opinion's contentions.
165. Albrecht, 273 U.S. at 11; Morgan, 237 U.S. at 641.
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The government cannot avoid the constitutional protections for
treason by simply calling the crime something else. Thus, the Quirin
Court would have to show either that the violation of the law of war in
the case was distinct from treason or, if treason is an element of an al-
legation of violating the law of war, that the constitutional protections
for treason defendants did not protect the defendant because the crime
was also a violation of the law of war. The Court seemed to make
both of these arguments, but gave virtually no support in precedent
for either one. As for whether treason is distinct from a violation of
the law of war, according to Quirin, the charge of violating the law of
war requires that the accused have aided the enemy--one cannot be an
enemy belligerent without associating with the enemy. 166
Adhering to and giving aid and comfort to the enemy, the consti-
tutional definition of treason, seems to be an element of a violation of
the law of war. The only basis for a distinction between treason and a
violation of the law of war that the Court gives is whether the defen-
dant wore a uniform, and the Court offers no support for this distinc-
tion. The only basis for an argument that the constitutional protec-
tions for treason defendants did not apply when they were also
charged with violating the law of war is the two cases of Morgan and
Albrecht, which did not reach the issue in the context of treason and
violations of the law of war. 167 In summary, the Quirin Court was un-
able to offer any reasonable explanation for why an American citizen
committing a violation of the law of war against the United States in
aid of its enemies during wartime does not commit treason, thus trig-
gering the constitutional protections for that offense.
168
166. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (distinguishing Milligan because Milligan was not associated
with the enemy and therefore was not an enemy belligerent).
167. Another possible reading of Morgan and Albrecht in the context of this case is that the
Court cited them for the general proposition that offenses that seem similar are indeed separate,
such as possession of alcohol and the selling of alcohol, and that although treason seemed like the
same offense as a violation of the law of war, it was separate because of the uniform/non-uniform
issue. However, even if this is how these cases should be read in the context of Quirin, it does
not get the Court over the question of how the uniform issue comes into play in making these
offenses distinct.
168. For an example of another case that might implicate the Treason Clause see e.g. United
States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541. The government has and could constitutionally charge
Lindh with conspiring to murder American soldiers, or carrying firearms without giving him the
protections required for treason. However, the government also charged Lindh with providing
support to terrorist organizations, Al Qaeda and the Taliban, entities that the government also
argues are enemies with whom the U.S. is engaged in a de facto war. Thus, Lindh has in effect
been charged with aiding an enemy during wartime. Not bringing these charges under treason
law might not pass Constitutional muster. However, the Quirin court goes even farther in its
holding than the Lindh case seems to go. A person charged with a federal crime for a treason-like
offense would still have all his other criminal procedural rights, while a person charged under
Quirin for a violation of the law of war for a treason-like offense would have none of them. For a
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Scholars have argued that many factors relating to the Quirin de-
cision indicate that it is bad law and should not bind courts anymore.
Two such scholars argue that "Quirin plainly fits the criteria typically
offered for judicial confinement or reconsideration . "... 169 In that
sense, Quirin is comparable to Korematsu, decided two years later by
virtually the same Court. 7 Like Quirin, Korematsu involved a situa-
tion where the Court's decision seemed to blatantly contradict express
constitutional provisions but satisfied the government's security con-
cerns in the middle of a war. Also like Quirin, Korematsu has never
been expressly overruled and is still technically good law. However,
Korematsu has drawn much more attention than Quirin. It has been
almost universally condemned, and there is little doubt that it is of
very little value as legal precedent.' In 1984, the Northern District
of California overturned Fred Korematsu's conviction on a writ of co-
ram nobis.'72 However, the court overturned the conviction on the
facts rather than based on the law. The court found that "there was
critical contradictory evidence known to the government and know-
ingly concealed from the courts" in Korematsu's original case.' 73 The
court recognized that it was not within its authority to overrule the
original Korematsu case on the law; "the Supreme Court's decision
stands as the law of this case and for whatever precedential value it
may still have."' 74 The court concluded by noting:
discussion of the distinctions between treason and treason-like crimes, most notably espionage,
see Henry Mark Holtzer, Why not Call it Treason?: From Korea to Afghanistan, 29 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 181 (2002); Ryan Norwood, None Dare Call it Treason: The Constitutionality of the
Death Penalty for Peacetime Espionage, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 820 (2002) (arguing that the death
penalty for espionage is unconstitutional because the burden of proof is lower than that for trea-
son and noting that courts have narrowed the definition of treason to acts committed when there
is a declared war).
169. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 30, at 1291. The criteria that Katyal and Tribe cite are the
facts that Quirin was a decision made under an extreme time constraint, there was virtually no
reliance issue at stake, and that it had constitutional dimensions that suggest its construction
should be guided by relevant developments in constitutional law. Id.
170. Id. at 1290. See also Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 457, 474 (2002) (arguing that Quirin and other cases authorizing the use of mili-
tary tribunals "are of doubtful continuing weight").
171. See generally Joel B. Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of Con-
stitutional Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perspective, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 649, 650
(1997) ("This disregard for constitutional rights, justified at the time by claims of military neces-
sity, and upheld by the Supreme Court, is now universally condemned."); Dean Masaru Hashi-
moto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 ASIAN PAC.
AM. L.J. 72 (1996); Micah Herzog, Is Korematsu Good Law In the Face of Terrorism? Procedural
Due Process in the Security Versus Liberty Debate, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 685 (2002).
172. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
173. Id. at 1417.
174. Id. at 1420.
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Korematsu remains on the pages of our legal and political his-
tory. As a legal precedent it is now recognized as having very
limited application. As historical precedent it stands as a con-
stant caution that in times of war or declared military necessity
our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional
guarantees. 175
Critics of Quirin argue that it is in the same category as Kore-
matsu; a case decided contrary to express constitutional rights as a re-
sult of war hysteria and is thus of little value as precedent. Even jus-
tices participating in the Quirin decision later articulated doubts about
it. Felix Frankfurter later expressed regret concerning the case. 176
The Court decided the case only twenty-four hours after granting cer-
tiorari and hearing oral arguments, and only after deciding the case
did the Court look for authority to support its decision. 177 In a 1962
interview Justice Douglas said that "[o]ur experience with [the Sabo-
teurs' Case] indicated ... to all of us that it is extremely undesirable to
announce a decision on the merits without an opinion accompanying




Several factors outside the realm of strict legal analysis throw
doubt on the value of Quirin. First, it seems as if President Roosevelt
put a large amount of pressure on the Court to side with the govern-
ment in Quirin, including implying that he would not enforce the
Court's decision if it did not and that he would execute the petitioners
pursuant to the order of a military commission no matter what the
Court did. 179 The Attorney General, Francis Biddle, wrote that the
President had told him, "I want one thing clearly understood, Francis.
I won't give them up. . . I won't hand them over to any United States
marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus. Understand?"'8 °
Furthermore, a major reason that the government wanted to try
the saboteurs before a military commission (other than the relaxed
rules of evidence, no appellate review, and ease of imposition of the
175. Id.
176. Danelski, supra note 70, at 80. When asked if Quiin could serve as precedent in the
1953 case of Rosenberg v. United States, Frankfurter labeled Quirin as "not a happy precedent."
Id.
177. Id. at 61, 72-73.
178. Id. at 80.
179. Id. at 68-69.
180. Id. at 68 (quoting FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY, 327, 331 (New York,
1962)).
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death penalty) was to cover up embarrassment that might occur to the
FBI if the trial was public. 8 ' The saboteurs were caught because one
of the eight, George Dasch, turned himself in. Dasch first called the
FBI in New York, where the agent who took the call treated it as a
crank."8 2 Dasch then went to the FBI in Washington where the agents
were skeptical about his story until he turned over $80,000 in cash the
Nazis had given him.'83 These facts were not made public at the time,
and the case was treated as a propaganda victory for the FBI. In fact,
there was no mention that the case was broken because Dasch turned
himself in. Rather, the New York Times reported: "One after another,
the saboteurs fell into the special agents' net .... Almost from the
moment the first group set foot on United States soil, the special
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were on their trail."' 84 J.
Edgar Hoover was even awarded a medal. 8 ' Although these factors
do not have direct bearing on the law handed down by Quirin, they
imply that if the facts surrounding the case were so manipulated, per-
haps the law was as well.
2. Quirin and Enemy Combatant Law Are Inapplicable Because the
United States Is Not at War and Congress Has Not Explicitly
Authorized the Use of Enemy Combatant Law
Even if Quirin is still good law, several constitutional roadblocks
must be overcome in order to apply it to the Hamdi and Padilla cases:
(1) whether the President can utilize enemy combatant law where
Congress has not committed the country to "total war" by expressly
declaring war; (2) in a de facto war, whether the President can unilat-
erally act under enemy combatant law without specific congressional
authorization; and (3) if the President needs congressional authoriza-
tion, whether he has such authorization in this situation. This section
submits that the only constitutional application of enemy combatant
law is if the President can unilaterally invoke the law in a de facto war
where Congress has foreseen the presence of hostilities and generally
authorized the President to act, because if a declaration of war or spe-
cific Congressional authorization of enemy combatant law is neces-
sary, the President clearly does not have it. This scenario may very
well be more than the Constitution can bear.
181. Id. at 66.
182. Id. at 64.
183. Id. at 64-65.
184. Id. (quoting N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1942, at 30.).
185. Id. at 72.
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Even if Quirin properly states the law concerning enemy combat-
ants, it is distinguishable and should not apply in the Hamdi and
Padilla cases. In the context of the present "war on terrorism," there
is insufficient congressional authorization for the Executive to charge
an individual as an enemy combatant."8 6 The Executive does not have
the authority to unilaterally declare that a state of war or crisis exists
such that he can charge citizens with violating the law of war, treat
them as enemy combatants, and deprive them of their constitutional
protections.
The Constitution prohibits the Executive from unilaterally
charging people with violating the law of war and classifying them as
enemy combatants. The Constitution specifically provides that Con-
gress has the power to "declare War" and "[t]o define and punish...
Offenses against the Laws of Nations," which includes the laws of
war.' 87 Thus, even if the President's power as the "Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy"'88 allows him great leeway with the
Constitution in times of war, because enemy combatant law under
Quirin allows for the deprivation of express constitutional rights, the
President cannot unilaterally deny a citizen of these rights without
"due process of the law."' 89
Due process of the law might restrict the President's ability to
invoke the enemy combatant law of Quirin strictly to times when Con-
gress has declared war. In a time of declared war, Congress has put
the country and the world on notice that the Nation's resources are
dedicated to the pursuit of war, and the President's war powers are at
their greatest peak. 9' The Quirin opinion was quick to point out this
very fact; "[t]he Constitution thus invests the President, as Com-
mander in Chief, with the power to wage war which Congress has de-
clared."191
Therefore, Quirin may be inapplicable to Hamdi and Padilla
simply because Congress has not formally declared war against anyone
186. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 30; Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Af-
ghanistan: Military Commissions and the Exercise of Executive Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648
(2002). In contrast to this Note, these two articles examine specifically the constitutionality of
President Bush's November 13, 2001 order authorizing the trial of certain non-U.S. citizens be-
fore military commissions. The order dealt exclusively with non-citizens. However, the argu-
ments of these articles are applicable here because there is no reason why non-citizens should be
given more constitutional protection than citizens.
187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, 11. See also Katyal & Tribe, supra note 30, at 1268;
Torruella, supra note 186, at 657.
188. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
189. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. See supra note 187.
190. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 30, at 1271-72.
191. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26.
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in the course of the so-called "war on terrorism." One cannot breach
the law of war and be an enemy combatant if there is no war. This ar-
gument would give the narrowest construction to Quirin and would
not expand its holding beyond the context in which it was decided:
during a state of declared war.
It can be argued that "a state of war may in fact exist without a
formal declaration" and that the war on terrorism is war, even without
a formal declaration.'92 The President may have some war powers
without a declaration of war from Congress if there is a de facto war, or
if Congress has recognized a "limited war."' 93  The extent of the
President's war powers in a de facto war are much less clear and de-
pend on the situation, and Congressional authorization plays a large
part in determining the nature of these powers.'94 The War Powers
Resolution makes it clear that where the President is acting without a
declaration of war, his war powers are not as strong and he has a
greater responsibility to keep Congress informed and to seek Congres-
sional authorization for his acts."s His power is "clearly indicated by
the circumstances."' 96 An overly broad expansion of the definition of
war might result in the Executive improperly attempting to use war




The Hamdi and Padilla cases imply that President Bush's war
powers in the undeclared, but de facto, "war on terrorism" include the
right to invoke enemy combatant law and charge people with violating
the law of war. However, assuming that the President can use enemy
combatant law in a defacto war, this counterargument begs the follow-
192. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring). See also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 667-70 (1862).
193. See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S. C. § 1541 (2002) (the President may constitution-
ally introduce U.S. forces into hostilities in only three circumstances: (1) a declared war; (2)
"specific statutory authorization"; or (3) in a "national emergency created by an attack upon the
United States," or its armed forces).
194. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 30, at 1272-77. See also J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare
War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27 (1991) (discussing the constitutional implications of a declared war and
an undeclared "limited war" on presidential power). For a very early Supreme Court precedent
involving the undeclared war on France in 1799, see Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 43 (1800) (Chase,
J., concurring) ("Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or congress may wage a limited
war; limited in place, in objects, and in time. If a general war is declared, its extent and opera-
tions are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a part of the law of nations; but if
a partial war is waged, its extent and operation depend on our municipal laws.").
195. 50 U.S.C. § 1541.
196. Id. § 1543. For example, under these principles President Lincoln may have been able
to use his war powers to their full extent to quash rebellion during the Civil War before Congress
formally declared war, while President Reagan's war powers were probably much more limited
in connection with the invasion of Grenada.
197. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 30, at 1295-96.
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ing questions: whether a de facto war exists today; if one exists,
whether the President needs congressional authorization to invoke en-
emy combatant law; and whether the current President has such au-
thorization to classify persons as enemy combatants in the present
situation. The Youngstown Sheet case is probably the most enlighten-
ing precedent on these issues.19 Using the principles set forth in
Youngstown Steel, this Note argues that at the very least the President
needs specific Congressional authorization to invoke enemy combatant
law in the present situation.
Ironically, the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi II, the Padilla court, and
critics of the application of enemy combatant law to the war on terror-
ism have all used Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown to sup-
port their conflicting positions. The Hamdi and Padilla courts treated
the military operations in Afghanistan as a de facto war. Hamdi II
stated that the President's power to invoke enemy combatant law was
unilateral because his powers in the context of national security are
"plenary and exclusive . . . a power which does not require as a basis
for its exercise an act of Congress." '199 However, the Fourth Circuit
still found congressional authorization for the President's invocation
of enemy combatant law: "[w]here as here the President does act with
statutory authorization from Congress, there is all the more reason for
deference [citing Jackson's Youngstown concurrence] ... [t]his defer-
ence extends to military designations of individuals as enemy combat-
ants."2 ° The Padilla court also viewed the joint resolution as provid-
198. Youngstown Steel, 343 U.S. at 582. Youngstown Steel involved the Supreme Court's
rejection of President Truman's order that the government take possession of the Nation's steel
mills to avoid a steel strike in the midst of the Korean War. Id. In tersely rejecting the Presi-
dent's argument that the seizure of the steel mills was within his war powers, the Court held that
the Commander in Chief clause of the Constitution did not authorize the President to seize pri-
vate property to further war aims without congressional authorization, as making laws regarding
such public policies were in the exclusive realm of Congress. Id. at 588. Justice Jackson's famous
concurrence enumerated his three categories of presidential action: (1) when the President acts
with "express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum;" (2) in the
absence of an express grant or denial of authority, the President may sometimes "at least as a
practical matter" act independently; (3) "when the President takes measures incompatible with
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb." Id. at 635-38. Justice
Jackson argued that the President's seizure of the steel mills fit into the third category because
Congress had statutorily defined ways that the government could seize private property in a
manner inconsistent with the President's procedure. Id. at 639. Justice Jackson argued the seizure
was unconstitutional and did not reach the question of how a de facto war in Korea affected the
President's power because he argued that the President's act would be unconstitutional even had
Congress declared war. Id. at 643.
199. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 304-320 (1936)).
200. Id. The congressional authorization to which the Fourth Circuit referred was Con-
gress's September 18, 2001 joint resolution entitled "Authorization for Use of Military Force."
The Resolution authorizes the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those
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ing statutory authorization for the invocation of enemy combatant
law.2°1
The Hamdi and Padilla courts overstepped their authority under
Quirin in several ways. First, the two courts expanded the holding of
Quirin to allow the President to invoke enemy combatant law unilater-
ally where Congress recognizes a de facto war. The Quirin opinion
provides no basis for its expansion to a de facto war. The expansion is
improper because the constitutional implications of enemy combatant
law are so severe. Where Congress recognizes that there is a de facto
war, as it may have done through its September 18 Resolution, but
does not invoke the President's full war power by declaring war, the
President must only use enemy combatant law with specific congres-
sional authorization, in order to comport with due process of the
law.
20 2
Second, the Hamdi and Padilla courts incorrectly viewed the Sep-
tember 18 Resolution as "statutory authorization from Congress" for
the invocation of enemy combatant law. The Resolution does not ex-
pressly authorize the President to charge citizens with violating the
law of war and classify them as enemy combatants. Nor is it authori-
zation for the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force"
against the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks. If Congress
wanted to allow the President to use enemy combatant law, it could
have said so. If it wanted him to have his full war powers, it could
have declared war. Thus, the President's actions in classifying Hamdi
and Padilla as enemy combatants most likely did not fall within Jus-
tice Jackson's first category of presidential action in Youngstown.
Under this line of criticism, because Congress has expressed a
statutory preference for trying crimes involving terrorism and harbor-
ing terrorists in civil courts, the President's invocation of enemy com-
batant law with Yasser Hamdi and Jose Padilla likely falls within Jus-
tice Jackson's third category. 0 3 Congress has passed several laws,
most notably the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990,204 making acts of
terrorism and aiding terrorist organizations federal crimes, expressing
a legislative preference for trials of these crimes in civil courts with all
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or per-
sons." Id. at 279-80 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001)).
201. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 598-99.
202. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 30 at 1266-77.
203. Torruella, supra note 186, at 663-65.
204. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 etseq. (1990) (amended 1992, 1994, 1996).
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constitutional protections available for the accused.2"5 The govern-
ment charged John Walker Lindh, whose story is nearly identical to
Hamdi's, with some of these very crimes.2"6 The Executive's claim
that military necessity requires the classification of Hamdi and Padilla
as enemy combatants is similar to President Truman's impermissible,
unilateral seizure of the steel mills in Youngstown, which Justice Jack-
son placed in his third category of constitutional action because Con-
gress had expressed a contrary legislative preference concerning the
government's seizure of private property. In the nearly one year that
the government has detained Hamdi, Congress could have authorized
the President to use enemy combatant law by statute, but it has not.207
B. The Hamdi Court Changed the Scope of Enemy Combatant Law as
Set Forth in Quirin in a Manner Inconsistent with the Constitution
This subsection assumes that even if Quirin is still good law and
was properly applied in the Hamdi opinions, the Hamdi court ex-
panded the Quirin precedent and enemy combatant law in a manner
inconsistent with the Constitution. Quirin held that individuals, even
U.S. citizens, charged with violating the law of war could be held and
tried as enemy combatants without the procedural protections of Arti-
cle III, section 2, cl. 3 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.2 8 How-
ever, Quirin left open the possibility of habeas review of the classifica-
tion as enemy combatants of the charges of violating the law of war,
although it dictated that courts give deference to the government's
classifications.29 Quirin also restricted the courts' review to the legal
sufficiency of the charges of violating the law of war. Thus, Quirin
sets the constitutional boundary of enemy combatant law.
The Hamdi II court, though admitting habeas review was possi-
ble,210 imposed another restriction that virtually makes that review
meaningless: according to the Court, once the government classifies an
individual as an enemy combatant, he has no right of access to a law-
yer to aid him in challenging that classification. The expansion gives
the Executive branch a tremendous amount of unchecked power over
205. Id. Furthermore, if the Executive insists on classifying certain terrorist organizations
as enemies with whom the U.S. is at war, then aiding and harboring terrorists implicates treason
law. See supra Section III.A.1.
206. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 547 (E.D. Va. 2002).
207. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 30, at 1276-77.
208. Supra Section I .B.1.
209. Id.
210. Yamashita and Quirin both very explicitly stated that enemy combatants are allowed
to challenge their classification through a habeas petition. Although the government argued to
the contrary in Hamdi II, it seems to have dropped this argument in Padilla because the court
does not even address the issue in that case.
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individual citizens, allowing it virtual unilateral authority to define the
charges against an individual, arrest him, and try him. This expansion
is unwise given that enemy combatant law as promulgated in Quirin
has such a dubious constitutional foundation in the first place."' This
subsection will attempt to show how an individual classified as an en-
emy combatant has less rights under the Hamdi II and Hamdi III
opinions than he did under Quirin, and thus how the court has re-
moved a roadblock on the ability of the Executive to totally revoke the
criminal procedure rights of individuals.
Although the Quirin case did not provide much of an escape
valve for citizens classified as enemy combatants, it did give them
something. Alleged enemy combatants are allowed to challenge their
classifications in the Court through a writ of habeas corpus and are al-
lowed lawyers to argue on their behalf.212 Although Quirin did not
specifically address the issue of whether enemy combatants are per-
mitted lawyers in proceedings to challenge their status as enemy com-
batants, the Quirin petitioners were all represented by highly qualified
lawyers from the Judge Advocate General's Office."1 Thus, Quirin, at
the very least, implicitly recognized "the obvious truth that the aver-
age defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect him-
self when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or lib-
erty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned
counsel." '214 In swiping all other constitutional protections away for
enemy combatants, Quirin still allowed them representation of counsel
in challenging their classification of enemy combatant status.
The Hamdi II court removed this protection in the case of Yaser
Hamdi. It remanded the case back to the district court instructing it
to determine if Hamdi was an enemy combatant and warning it to give
the military very strict deference.1 5 It also reversed the district court's
order appointing the Federal Defender as Hamdi's counsel and re-
fused to allow the Defender access to Hamdi.216 Hence, the Fourth
Circuit instructed the district court to determine whether or not
Hamdi was an enemy combatant before deciding whether he should
have access to a lawyer. He is assumed an enemy combatant until
proven otherwise.217 Without a lawyer to argue that he is not an en-
211. Supra Section III.Al.
212. Id.
213. Danelski, supra note 70, at 68. Ironically, one of the petitioner's lawyers was Chief
Justice Stone's son, Major Lauson Stone. Justice Stone wrote the opinion in the case.
214. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
215. Hamdi II, 296 F.2d at 283-84.
216. Id. at 284.
217. It should be noted that the Fourth Circuit did not detail any of the procedural aspects
of how the enemy combatant determination would occur on remand. The Federal Defender rep-
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emy combatant on habeas review and that the charges against him are
not violations of the law of war, the deck is stacked heavily against a
citizen the government has labeled an enemy combatant.
A series of hypotheticals illustrates how much power the Execu-
tive has over the revocation of constitutional criminal procedure rights
when it is allowed such an advantage in the classification of individu-
als as enemy combatants. Is just being a member of Al Qaeda a viola-
tion of the law of war? Is being a member of the Taliban and taking
up arms against the United States, as Hamdi and Lindh allegedly did,
a violation? What about members of the Taliban who do not bear
arms? Does an American citizen living in America who donates
money to the Al Qaeda terrorism network violate the law of war?
These are all open questions. If the Executive is allowed to detain
people it accuses of doing these things as enemy combatants in viola-
tion of the law of war, and the detainees are not allowed lawyers to
challenge the classification, then the Executive has almost unlimited
power over individuals: it can define crimes, detain people indefinitely
for those crimes, try them without juries, or perhaps even summarily
execute them.218 The only protection the Hamdi II court gives the ac-
cused enemy combatants is the right to have a court review the
charges against them on a habeas petition, with great deference to the
Executive, without a lawyer to argue the case.
Allowing enemy combatants the right to counsel to challenge
their classifications on habeas review can only help to develop the law
of war and answer the question of what constitutes a violation in the
context of terrorism. It may also give some constitutional protection
to those accused of being enemy combatants. If accused enemy
combatants are allowed attorneys to argue whether or not the
resented Hamdi before the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi II, and in refusing to appoint the Defender
as counsel and in refusing to allow him access to Hamdi the court did not order the Defender not
to represent him in the enemy combatant determination on remand. The court certainly denied
Hamdi's right to appointed counsel, and the right of Hamdi to have physical access to counsel,
appointed or retained, but it did not explicitly revoke Hamdi's right of retained counsel in court
to argue his habeas petition and did not prohibit the Federal Defender from representing him. It
also left open the narrow possibility that the lower court could still appoint counsel if it heard
and showed substantial deference to all the government's arguments as to why giving Hamdi
access to counsel would negatively impact national security. Thus, although through its words
the Fourth Circuit seemed to be totally willing to deprive Hamdi of his right to counsel for his
habeas petition, in practice it is a little unclear just how far the court was willing to go in denying
Hamdi counsel. Indeed, the Federal Defender argued the appeal on Hamdi's behalf in Hamdi
III, though without the right to consult with him. It is enough to note that although Hamdi may
have been represented, it is not because the court found that he had a right to be and he was not
allowed to consult with counsel.
218. Quirin leaves unanswered the question of whether the president can summarily dis-
patch an enemy combatant without even a trial before a military commission, seemingly because
the justices could not agree on this issue and because it was not necessary to decide the case.
Danelski, supra note 70, at 76.
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batants are allowed attorneys to argue whether or not the accusations
against them amount to violations of the law of war, the courts will
have to make decisions and draw lines to determine what constitutes a
violation of the law of war, even if they give the Executive great defer-
ence. After all, at the end of the day, "It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. 219 Thus,
if those accused of violating the law of war have attorneys, habeas re-
view of the charges will be meaningful, the law of war will be become
better defined, and enemy combatant law will stray no farther from
the text of the Constitution than it already has. If they are not allowed
counsel, who knows what crimes might become violations of the law
of war? Perhaps every crime short of pick pocketing will provoke the
Executive to charge a violation of the law of war against the citizen ac-
cused of committing it. The Hamdi II court's expansion of the Quirin
precedent opens the enemy combatant loophole further with tremen-
dous potential risk to constitutional criminal procedure rights.
In any event, Hamdi II expanded Quirin by holding that an al-
leged enemy combatant does not have a right to counsel in challenging
his classification, and Hamdi III may also have expanded Quirin fur-
ther by suggesting that courts do not even have to review enemy com-
batant classifications for charges of violating the law of war.
C. The Padilla Court Expanded the Quirin Precedent to Give Greater
Procedural Protection for Alleged Enemy Combatants
This subsection argues that the Padilla court, in contrast to the
Hamdi court, not only found a presumptive right of an alleged enemy
combatant to counsel in challenging the classification through a ha-
beas petition, but also expanded the scope of what the alleged combat-
ant is able to argue. This approach is preferable to the approach in the
Hamdi decisions because it provides more procedural protection for
citizens classified as enemy combatants, which in turn makes enemy
combatant law more consistent with the Constitution. Unlike Hamdi,
Padilla refused to expand the ill-conceived departure from the Consti-
tution that enemy combatant law and the Quirin precedent allow.
The Padilla court's holding that the petitioner had a non-
constitutionally-based right to a lawyer in challenging his classification
as an enemy combatant is inconsistent with the Hamdi II decision, but
provides more protection to suspected enemy combatants. The
Padilla court carefully crafted its holding to provide alleged enemy
combatants with the protection of right to counsel and also to provide
219. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
Seattle University Law Review
courts with flexibility in applying that right. Although the Padilla
court could have legally rooted the right in the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution or the Due Process Clause, it chose to find a non-
constitutional basis for the right. 22' This means that an accused en-
emy combatant's right to counsel is not immutable, and courts have
the flexibility to restrict the right under the circumstances, as the
Padilla court did, restricting it to representation for the habeas peti-
tion and not allowing representation of counsel for other interrogations
of Padilla.221 Indeed, now that the government has asked the court to
reconsider its order that Padilla be able to meet with his attorneys in
the prosecution of his habeas petition,222 because it based the right to
counsel on the habeas statute and not the Sixth Amendment, the court
will have the flexibility to reverse its prior order based on new facts
raised but without changing the law.
Rooting the right to counsel in the habeas statute rather than the
Constitution also allowed the Padilla court to distinguish Hamdi II
rather than decline to follow it.223 The primary basis for distinction
was that the lower court's order in Hamdi II did not take the national
security implications of Hamdi's representation by counsel into ac-
count, and did not hear full arguments on the issue.224 Although it is
true that the Hamdi H court criticized the lower court for these rea-
sons, Hamdi H never recognized any right of Hamdi to a lawyer, and
on remand ordered the court to consider the government's national se-
curity arguments with "respect at every step. '' 22' Thus, under a gen-
erous interpretation of Hamdi II, the presumption is that the alleged
enemy combatant will have no right to counsel and may be able to
overcome that presumption. Despite not finding an immutable right
to counsel rooted in the Constitution, the Padilla court recognized a
presumptive right to counsel for those classified as enemy combatants
and provided them with a higher level of procedural protection than
the Hamdi H court.
The largest innovation of the Padilla court was allowing sup-
posed enemy combatants to present facts and evidence of their own in
support of their challenge to their classification, and holding that it
would evaluate the evidence presented by the government supporting
220. See supra Section I.C. for a discussion of how the Sixth Amendment provides a basis
for a right of an enemy combatant to counsel in challenging his classification on a habeas peti-
tion.
221. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
222. See supra note 112.
223. See supra Section I.C.
224. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
225. Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 284.
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the classification and not just the legal sufficiency of the charges. The
court notes that Quirin does not provide for such a review, but does
not see an evaluation of the facts supporting enemy combatant status
as inconsistent with Quirin because "the facts in Quirin were stipu-
lated" and "the Quirin Court moved directly to the legal principles
applicable to unlawful combatants, and then to the application of
those principles to the undisputed facts. '226 Thus, the Padilla court
frames its holding as only an expansion of the law in Quirin, which
was necessary because the issue of how to review the evidence sur-
rounding the government's classification of a citizen as an enemy
combatant was a matter of first impression. Nonetheless, the Padilla
court's holding that it will review the evidence and not just the charges
of violating the law of war can easily be seen as inconsistent with ex-
press language of Quirin, and also with the Yamashita case, which the
Padilla court does not mention.227 Even if allowing a review of the
government's evidence is not inconsistent with Yamashita and Quirin,
the Padilla court could certainly have refused to review the govern-
ment's evidence and restricted itself to a review of the legal sufficiency
of the charges, and the court could have found ample support for do-
ing so in those two cases.
Allowing the courts to review evidence that an alleged enemy
combatant violated the law of war, and not just the legal sufficiency of
the charges, provides greater procedural protection. If the courts' re-
view is restricted simply to the sufficiency of the charges, the govern-
ment can allege that a citizen has violated the law of war and classify
him as an enemy combatant with little evidence to support the suspi-
cion. A citizen found in the wrong place at the wrong time in Af-
ghanistan may be charged with aiding the Al Qaeda terrorist network
and classified as an enemy combatant even if there is no real basis for
that suspicion. Such a standard allows the government to become
overly inclusive in its charges for violating the laws of war. The gov-
ernment can invoke enemy combatant law against citizens on mere
suspicions. However, if the evidence supporting the violation is also
evaluated, albeit under Padilla with a standard that shows the gov-
226. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
227. See supra Sections I.A.1., I.B. See also Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 432 (9th
Cir. 1956). The Colepaugh court obviously read Quirin as saying that courts could review only
the charges of violating the law of war and not the facts:
[T]he petitioner earnestly insists that he could not have been an unlawful belligerent,
subject to the Military Commission, because he did not pass through military and na-
val lines of the United States for the purpose of committing hostile acts. Of course
this contention involves a matter of fact directly bearing upon his guilt or innocence,
not within the scope of this inquiry.
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ernment deference, the government's power is limited. Enemy com-
batant law cannot be invoked and a citizen denied all of his constitu-
tional criminal procedure rights unless there is a threshold evidentiary
showing that he actually committed the violations of the law of war of
which he is accused.
The Padilla approach is preferable to the Hamdi II approach
concerning the right to counsel, and to the Hamdi III approach con-
sidering what the court will review, because it provides alleged enemy
combatants with procedural rights that are more consistent with the
rights granted all other accused criminals under the Constitution. Al-
though enemy combatant law exists because of national security and
public safety implications, a balance must be struck somewhere if sus-
pected enemy combatants are to be given any process. If the courts
continue to apply Quirin, they should view it as the absolute limit on
the revocation of procedural protections for enemy combatants and
should go no further in revoking such protections than did Quirin.
The Padilla court does not go as far as Quirin. However while provid-
ing alleged combatants with more process than Quirin or Hamdi,
Padilla does not give them nearly as much as would be due to an ac-
cused mass-murder or serial rapist. Nonetheless, it is a step in the
right direction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in Padilla v. Bush applied what was an already ques-
tionable constitutional concept: the President, in a time of war, can
charge a United States citizen with violating the law of war, making
that person an alleged enemy combatant, and can then revoke the ac-
cused's Fifth and Sixth Amendment criminal procedure protections.
The courts can review the charges on a petition for habeas corpus to
insure that they adequately allege violations of the law of war, but they
have to give the President deference. This principle, the legacy of
Quirin, has a very shaky constitutional foundation, but was still tech-
nically good precedent at the time of Hamdi and Padilla. The gov-
ernment is invoking it, and lower courts feel obligated to follow it.
However, when confronted with an opportunity to use enemy
combatant law to strip away more procedural protection for accused
enemy combatants than even allowed under Quirin, courts should
show restraint. The Padilla Court chose to give more process to al-
leged enemy combatants than was due under precedent. The Hamdi
court, rather than distinguishing precedent, not only chose to apply it,
but to expand it to the detriment of the procedural protections for
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supposed enemy combatants. Under Hamdi III, although an accused
enemy combatant can still file a petition for habeas corpus, he may or
may not have a right to have the charges against him reviewed via a
petition for habeas corpus, and under Hamdi II he has no right to be
represented by counsel on that review. Obviously, this development
gives even more deference to the Executive Branch, and further de-
creases the chances that citizens wrongly accused of violating the law
of war can reclaim their constitutional rights. It is but a further un-
warranted step away from the clear criminal procedure protections
that the Constitution supposedly guarantees all American citizens.
How enemy combatant law will develop in the immediate and
distant future is unclear, particularly given that the Hamdi and Padilla
opinions pull the scope of the law in different directions. If in the fu-
ture the government classifies more citizens as enemy combatants,
courts, including the Supreme Court if it takes certiorari in Hamdi,
may very well choose to take the Hamdi route and give less procedural
protection under enemy combatant law. Writing in dissent in The
Application of Yamashita over 50 years ago, Justice Murphy lamented
the implications of enemy combatant law even when applied to non-
citizens and attributed it to the "high feelings of the moment.""22 Be-
lieving that courts would come to their senses, he made this predic-
tion: "But in the sober afterglow will come the realization of the
boundless and dangerous implications of the procedure sanctioned to-
day."229 Perhaps the Justice should not have been so sure.
228. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 28.
229. Id.
